PROJECT TWO

AUSTRALIA 1966-75

Introduction

This second project begins where the South Australian project ends. We start with an acceptable methodology and preliminary indications that a similar national analysis could find a strong relationship between class and vote, and weaker relationships between swing and both age and public housing tenancy.

The SA project however uncovered more questions than answers. Here are just a few:

1. If there is a relationship between age and swing, and class and vote, and there is an obvious additive relationship between vote and swing, is there some corresponding link between age and class that could relate to the age of the workforce?

2. What about the public housing question? Was the relationship between swing and public housing simply a one-off thing for 1973-75 or did it have implications for longer-term volatility? What about other housing variables? Are they important too?

3. The S.A. project did not discriminate between the sexes. The results indicated that white-collar women workers (for example) voted in a similar way to white-collar male workers. The lower ALP vote amongst women was therefore thought to be due to the greater concentration of women in white collar jobs. Is this really the case? Will a more detailed national break-down of age and class by sex satisfactorily resolve this question? What about housewives and working wives? How different are they? How does the family child-rearing cycle interact with these two variables to influence the Labor vote?

4. Would the S.A. results apply on a national level? What about the influence of State Governments, State Labor Branches, and differing geographic, economic and cultural regions across the country? What impact do they have on a model which seeks to compare a seat in, say, Inner-city Sydney, with a seat in outback Queensland and an urban/ rural seat on the outskirts of Perth? Can all of these different sorts of seats be "lumped in" together in the one model? In other words, does Australia vote as a nation or a collection of regions or states?

5. What about long-term trends? Are there one or more variables which enable us to predict the likely long-rung Labor vote in any seat across Australia? If this is the case can we come to some sort of conclusions about Labor's performance across the various states? Is this due to variations in the demographic compositions of the States or are exogenous state-based political factors important?

6. Can we uncover some demographic groups across the nation which are consistently more volatile than other groups? What implications does this sort of finding hold for national campaigns in a single-member system?

7. What about personal votes in federal electorates? Do some electorates poll consistently worse or better than predicted results would indicate? Does this tell us anything about important local factors that can be avoided or copied in other electorates?

The final questions relate to the rise and fall of Labor's electoral fortunes under Gough Whitlam between 1966 and 1975. In 1966,

Whitlam saw an outer-urban constituency which was then largely
ignored by both conservative parties. He identified this
demographic group and its vested political interests and
devised platform and policy innovations to win its support.
In 1972 he won the required number of seats to form a
Government as a result of disproportionate swings in these
areas.

What can the present project tell us about these elections
between 1966 and 1975? Were Labor's gains in 1969 and 1972
concentrated among this outer-urban group? What happened
in 1974? What groups did Labor lose in 1975? Was the swing
away from Labor confined to the 1974 to 1975 period or did
it begin earlier? What lessons can we learn from this period?

Methodology

The South Australian project provided the basis of the methodology used in this first National project. Basically, this methodology employed a rigorous statistical comparison of demographic and political variables based on all federal electorates for elections between 1966 and 1975.

The demographic variables were based on the 1971 Census results, broken down by the Bureau of Statistics into the 1968 Federal electorate boundaries. For the purposes of this project the Australian Capital Territory was split into two identical demographic groupings.

Two hundred and six (206) demographic variables were chosen on a "when in doubt, include it" basis. Therefore almost all tables included in the 1971 Census were used in one way or another. Wherever possible, value judgements relating to the construction of the variables were avoided, however the South Australian project was naturally used to set out general guidelines. The total population figure for federal electorates was used as the denominator for all variables where this was possible, as I was anxious to allow for interaction between the Census population and the electoral population during the period of analysis. I also wanted to make the demographic variables as representative as I possibly could of the entire population, not just the workforce, or persons aged 18 and over.

I set out below the variables used, with the corresponding variable number which appears in results' sheets. A detailed explanation of the variables, follows this list.

12	Percentage of total males:				Males 0-4
13	"	"	"	"	Males 5-9
14	"	"	"	"	Males 10-14
15	"	"	"	"	Males 15-19
16	"	"	"	"	Males 20-24
17	"	"	"	"	Males 25-29
18	"	"	"	"	Males 30-34
19	"	"	"	"	Males 35-39
20	"	"	"	"	Males 40-44
21	"	"	"	"	Males 45-49
22	"	"	"	"	Males 50-54
23	"	"	"	"	Males 55-59
24	"	"	"	"	Males 60-64
25	"	"	"	"	Males 65-69
26	"	"	"	"	Males 70 and over
27	Percentage of total females:				Females 0-4
28	"	"	"	"	Females 5-9
29	"	"	"	"	Females 10-14
30	"	"	"	"	Females 15-19
31	"	"	"	"	Females 20-24
32	"	"	"	"	Females 25-29
33	"	"	"	"	Females 30-34
34	"	"	"	"	Females 35-39
35	"	"	"	"	Females 40-44
36	"	"	"	"	Females 45-49
37	"	"	"	"	Females 50-54
38	"	"	"	"	Females 55-59
39	"	"	"	"	Females 60-64
40	"	"	"	"	Females 65-69
41	"	"	"	"	Females 70 and over

42	Religion:	Percentage of total population:	Baptist
43		"	Brethren
44		"	Catholic/Roman Catholic
45		"	Churches of Christ
46		"	Church of England
47		"	Congregational
48		"	Greek and other Orthodox
49		"	Jehovah's Witness
50		"	Lutheran
51		"	Methodist
52		"	Presbyterian
53		"	Salvation Army
54		"	Seventh Day Adventist
55		"	Protestant(undefined)
56		"	Other Christian
57		"	All non-Christian
58		"	No religion/No reply
59	Percentage of total population born in:		Australia
60	"		New Zealand
61	"		U.K. & Ireland
62	"		Austria
63	"		Czechoslovakia
64	"		Germany
65	"		Greece
66	"		Hungary
67	"		Italy
68	"		Malta
69	"		Netherlands
70	"		Poland
71	"		U.S.S.R.
72	"		Yugoslavia
73	"		Other Europe
74	"		Asia
75	"		Africa
76	"		Canada
77	"		U.S.A.
78	"		Other
79	Period of residence of overseas born:		0-4 years
80	"		5-9 years
81	"		10-16 years
82	"		17 years and over

83　Mobility: Percentage of persons who <u>have</u> moved in last 5 years.
84　Usual Major Activity: Males "Working"　　　as % of <u>total</u> males
85　　　　"　　　　　　　Males "Home Duties" " " " " "
86　　　　"　　　　　　　Males "Other"(excludes children)"　"
87　　　　"　　　　　　　Females "Working"　" " " " females
88　　　　"　　　　　　　Females "Home Duties" " " " " "
89　　　　"　　　　　　　Females "Other"　　" " " " "
90　Male children not yet at school as % of <u>total</u> males.
91　Female children " " " "　" " " " females.
92　Male children now at school　　" " " " males.
93　Female " 　　 " 　 " 　　 " 　 " " " " females.
94　Males completing school to Level 1 " " " males.
95　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　2 " " "　　"
96　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　3 " " "　　"
97　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　4 " " "　　"
98　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　5 " " "　　"
99　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　6 " " "　　"
100　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　7 " " "　　"
101　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　8 " " "　　"
102　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　9 " " "　　"
103　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　10 " " "　　"
104　Females　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　1 " " " females
105　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　2 " " "　　"
106　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　3 " " "　　"
107　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　4 " " "　　"
108　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　5 " " "　　"
109　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　6 " " "　　"
110　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　7 " " "　　"
111　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　8 " " "　　"
112　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　9 " " "　　"
113　　"　　　　"　　　　"　　　"　　"　10 " " "　　"
114　Males who never attended/not stated as % of <u>total</u> males.
115　Females " 　 " 　 " 　　 " 　 " " " " " females.
116　Qualifications:　Males - Trade (as % of total males)
117　　　　"　　　　　　Males - Technician " "　　" 　"
118　　　　"　　　　　　Males - Non-degree tertiary　　"
119　　　　"　　　　　　Males - Univ. bachelor degree　"
120　　　　"　　　　　　Males - Higher Degree　　　"
121　　　　"　　　　　　Females - Trade (as % of total females)
122　　　　"　　　　　　Females - Technician　"　　"　　"
123　　　　"　　　　　　Females - Non-degree tertiary　"
124　　　　"　　　　　　Females - Univ. bachelor degree　"
125　　　　"　　　　　　Females - Higher Degree　　　"

126	Labour Force:	Males 15-19 as % of total males.
127	"	Males 20-24
128	"	Males 25-29
129	"	Males 30-34
130	"	Males 35-39
131	"	Males 40-44
132	"	Males 45-49
133	"	Males 50-54
134	"	Males 55-59
135	"	Males 60-64
136	"	Males 65 and over
137	"	Females 15-19 as % of total females
138	"	Females 20-24
139	"	Females 25-29
140	"	Females 30-34
141	"	Females 35-39
142	"	Females 40-44
143	"	Females 45-49
144	"	Females 50-54
145	"	Females 55-59
146	"	Females 60-64
147	"	Females 65 and over
148	"	Persons 15-19 as % of total population
149	"	Persons 20-24
150	"	Persons 25-29
151	"	Persons 30-34
152	"	Persons 35-39
153	"	Persons 40-44
154	"	Persons 45-49
155	"	Persons 50-54
156	"	Persons 55-59
157	"	Persons 60-64
158	"	Persons 65 and over
159	Percentage of women who work ($\frac{\text{Female workforce}}{\text{Total females}}$ X 100)
160	Occupational Status: Males - employer (as % of total males)
161	" " Males - self employed " " "
162	" " Males - employee " " " "
163	" " Males - helper " " " "
164	" " Males - total unemployed " "
165	" " Females - employer (as % of total females)
166	" " Females - self-employed " " "
167	" " Females - employee " " "
168	" " Females - helper " " "

169   Occupational Status: Females - total unemployed (as % of total females)
170   Occupation Males - Professional (as % of total males)
171   Males - Administrative
172   Males - Clerical
173   Males - Sales workers
174   Males - Farmers etc
175   Males - Miners
176   Males - Transport workers
177   Males - Craftsmen etc
178   Males - Service workers etc
179   Males - Armed Services
180   Males - Other and not stated
181   Males - unemployed.
182   Occupation Females - Professional (as % of total females)
183   Females - Administrative
184   Females - Clerical
185   Females - Sales workers
186   Females - Farmers etc
187   Females - Miners
188   Females - Transport workers
189   Females - Craftsmen etc
190   Females - Service workets etc
191   Females - Armed Services
192   Females - Other and not stated
193   Females - Unemployed.
194   Usual Major Activity - females "working" as % of total females
195   "   "   "   females "home duties" "   "   "
196   Rented Dwellings: % of total dwellings - furnished houses
197   "   "   " "   "   "   - S.H.A. Houses
198   "   "   " "   "   "   - other houses (incl. not stated)
199   "   "   " "   "   "   - furnished flats
200   "   "   " "   "   "   - S.H.A. flats
201   "   "   " "   "   "   - other flats (incl. not stated)
202   Average rent cost ($¢) - furnished houses
203   "   "   "   - S.H.A. houses
204   "   "   "   - other houses
205   "   "   "   - furnished flats
206   "   "   "   - S.H.A. flats
207   "   "   "   - other flats

208	Nature of occupancy: % of total dwellings	- houses owner
209	" " " " " " "	- houses tenant of S.H.A.
210	" " " " " " "	- houses tenant other
211	" " " " " " "	- flats owner
212	" " " " " " "	- flats tenant of S.H.A.
213	" " " " " " "	- flats tenant other
214	% of total dwellings with television	
215	" " " " " no motor vehicles	
216	" " " " " 1 motor vehicle	
217	" " " " " 2+motor vehicles	

Methodology continued - a closer look at the variables:

Variables 12 to 41:   The percentage of total males and total females in the age groups described.

Variables 42 to 58:   The percentage of the total population in the religious groups described.

Variables 59 to 82:   The percentage of the total population born in the countries described (variables 59 to 78) and the period of residence in Australia of overseas-born persons expressed as a percentage of total overseas-born persons (variables 79 to 82).

Variable 83:   The percentage of persons who had moved home during the past five years as a percentage of total persons.

Variables 84 to 86:   The percentage of the total male population who described their usual major activity as "working", "home duties" (negligible) or "Other" (these were mainly men in institutions - repatriation hospitals and the like - or retired persons;   children were excluded from this variable).

Variable 87:   The percentage of total females who were in the workforce in Census week. This includes normal working females and housewives who worked during the week prior to Census night, 1971. This latter group was very small and the variable really described working women.

Variable 88:   The percentage of total females who were on full-time "home duties" during the week prior to Census night. These were the housewives, proper.

Variable 89:   The percentage of total females who did not describe their usual major activity as either "working" or "home duties". This is the female equivalent of Variable 86.

Variables 90 to 93: The percentage of total males and total females who were either not yet at school or "now at school". These variables of course were included because of their relevance to the parents of these children rather than their intrinsic value.

Variables 94 to 113: The numbers of total males and females who had completed school to levels one to ten as a percentage of males and females who had completed school. An explanatory table is set out below:

State or Territory	Grade or form reported										
N.S.W., VIC, A.C.T., TAS.	1 & 2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5 & 6	
QLD.	1, 2 & 3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
S.A., N.T.	1, 2 & 3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	
W.A.	1, 2 & 3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5 & 6	
Level assigned	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
	Primary School						Secondary School				

Table 2.1

Variables 114 and 115: The percentage of total males and total females who had never attended school. This variable unfortunately, is not as small as one would have expected, averaging about four percent for males and females.

Variables 116 to 125: The percentage of total males and females who had actually obtained the described qualification levels.

Variables 126 to 158: The percentage of total males, total females and total population who were in the workforce and in the described age groups.

Variable 159: The percentage of total females who were in the female workforce.

Variables 160 to 169: The percentage of total males and total
females who described their occupational status as employers,
self-employed (including small farmers), employees, helpers
(mainly spouses who helped out in family businesses, usually
shops) or unemployed.

Variables 170 to 193: The percentage of the total male and female
population in the occupation groups listed. The unemployed males
and females in this group were the same as the unemployed males
and females in the preceding "Occupational Status" table. The
figure was repeated to facilitate comparisons within the different
groups on the computer print-out. Because of the importance of
the Occupation Groups, a Classification of Occupations summary is
provided below in table 2.2.

The reader can see the Statistician has grouped the 73 Occupation
minor groups used in the South Australian analysis into 11 major
groups. This prevented a more detailed examination of the minor
groups but otherwise did not detract from the value of the results.

2.11

Table 2.2

CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS
SUMMARY

Major and Minor Occupation Groups	Code Numbers
0: PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND RELATED WORKERS	001–091
Architects, Engineers and Surveyors, Professional	001–010
Chemists, Physicists, Geologists and Other Physical Scientists	013–017
Biologists, Veterinarians, Agronomists and Related Scientists	020–022
Medical Practitioners and Dentists	025–026
Nurses, including Probationers or Trainees	030–034
Professional Medical Workers, n.e.c.	035–040
Teachers	041–059
Clergy and Related Members of Religious Orders	062–063
Law Professionals	064
Artists, Entertainers, Writers and Related Workers	065–068
Draftsmen and Technicians, n.e.c.	070–081
Other Professional, Technical and Related Workers	082–091
1: ADMINISTRATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND MANAGERIAL WORKERS	100–119
Administrative and Executive Officials, Government, n.e.c.	100–106
Employers, Workers on Own Account, Status O, Directors, Managers, n.e.c.	110–119
2: CLERICAL WORKERS	150–163
Book-keepers and Cashiers	150
Stenographers and Typists	155
Other Clerical Workers	160–163
3: SALES WORKERS	200–217
Insurance, Real Estate Salesmen, Auctioneers and Valuers	200–201
Commercial Travellers and Manufacturers Agents	205
Proprietors and Shopkeepers, Workers on Own Account, n.e.c., Status O, Retail and Wholesale Trade, Salesmen, Shop Assistants and Related Workers	210–217
4: FARMERS, FISHERMEN, HUNTERS, TIMBER GETTERS AND RELATED WORKERS	300–356
Farmers and Farm Managers	300–316
Farm Workers, including Farm Foremen	320–334
Wool Classers	335
Hunters and Trappers	340
Fishermen and Related Workers	345–346
Timber Getters and Other Forestry Workers	355–356
5: MINERS, QUARRYMEN AND RELATED WORKERS	400–425
Miners, Mineral Prospectors and Quarrymen	400–411
Well Drillers, Oil, Water and Related Workers	420–421
Mineral Treaters	425
6: WORKERS IN TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION	500–562
Deck and Engineer Officers, Ship, not Services	500–501
Deck and Engine Room Hands, Ship and Boatmen, not Services	505
Aircraft Pilots, Navigators and Flight Engineers, not Services	510
Drivers and Firemen, Rail Transport	515–517
Drivers, Road Transport	520–524
Guards and Conductors, Railway	530
Inspectors, Supervisors, Traffic Controllers and Despatchers, Transport	535–540
Telephone, Telegraph and Related Telecommunication Operators	545–549
Postmasters, Postmen and Messengers	555–557
Workers in Transport and Communication, n.e.c.	560–562

Table 2.2

Classification of Occupations—continued

Schedule – continued

Major and Minor Occupation Groups	Code Numbers
7/8: TRADESMEN, PRODUCTION-PROCESS WORKERS AND LABOURERS, N.E.C.	600–785
Spinners, Weavers, Knitters, Dyers and Related Workers	600–606
Tailors, Cutters, Furriers and Related Workers	609–617
Leather Cutters, Lasters, Sewers (except Gloves and Garments) and Related Workers	621–623
Furnacemen, Rollers, Drawers, Moulders and Related Metal Making and Treating Workers	627–631
Precision Instrument Makers, Watchmakers, Jewellers and Related Workers	636–640
Toolmakers, Metal Machinists, Mechanics, Plumbers and Related Metal Workers	642–659
Electricians and Related Electrical and Electronic Workers	660–669
Metal Workers, Metal and Electrical Production-Process Workers, n.e.c.	670–674
Carpenters, Woodworking Machinists, Cabinetmakers and Related Workers	675–685
Painters and Decorators	687–688
Bricklayers, Plasterers and Construction Workers, n.e.c.	691–698
Compositors, Printing Machinists, Engravers, Bookbinders and Related Workers	703–708
Potters, Kilnmen, Glass and Clay Formers and Related Workers	711–716
Millers, Bakers, Butchers, Brewers and Related Food and Drink Workers	720–728
Chemical, Sugar and Paper Production-Process Workers	735–737
Tobacco Preparers and Tobacco Product Makers	739 —
Paper Products, Rubber, Plastic and Production-Process Workers, n.e.c.	743–750
Packers, Wrappers, Labellers	754
Stationary Engine, Excavating and Lifting Equipment Operators	757–763
Storemen and Freight Handlers	766–768
Labourers, n.e.c.	772–785
9: SERVICE, SPORT AND RECREATION WORKERS	800–852
Fire Brigade, Police and Other Protective Service Workers	800–802
Housekeepers, Cooks, Maids and Related Workers	805–811
Waiters, Bartenders	815–816
Caretakers, Cleaners, Buildings	820–821
Barbers, Hairdressers and Beauticians	825
Launderers, Dry Cleaners and Pressers	830
Athletes, Sportsmen and Related Workers	835
Photographers and Camera Operators	840
Undertakers and Crematorium Workers	845
Service, Sport, Recreation Workers, n.e.c.	850–852
10: MEMBERS OF ARMED SERVICES	855–862
Officers, Royal Australian Air Force	855
Other Ranks, Royal Australian Air Force	856
Officers, Australian Military Forces	857
Other Ranks, Australian Military Forces	858
Officers, Royal Australian Navy	859
Other Ranks, Royal Australian Navy	860
Officers, Overseas Forces in Australia	861
Other Ranks, Overseas Forces in Australia	862
11: OCCUPATION INADEQUATELY DESCRIBED OR NOT STATED	865
Occupation Inadequately Described or Not Stated: excluding Managerial Workers, "Other and Inadequately Described or Not Stated", code No. 119 Major Group 1	865

Variable 194: The percentage of total females who described their usual major activity as "working". Variable 194 is always slightly smaller than variable 87 as V194 excludes women who, for one reason or another worked at all during the week prior to Census night. Thus V194 is a "purer" version of working women.

Variable 195: The percentage of total females who worked (part-time) and who described their usual major activity as "home duties". They are basically housewives who work part-time (or who state they work part-time for tax purposes).

Variables 196 to 201: The percentage of total dwellings which are rented and which fall into the categories described in the table, i.e. rented furnished houses, rented State Housing Authority Houses, and so on.

Variables 202 to 207: The average rent cost of rented dwellings expressed in dollars and cents, to the nearest ten cents.

Variables 208 to 213: The percentage of total dwellings which are occupied and which fall into the occupation categories described, e.g. V218 is the percentage of total homes occupied by the owners of those homes, and so on.

Variables 214 to 217: The percentage of total dwellings with television, and with no cars, one car, or two or more cars parked on the premises on Census night.

The Political Variables

The period of analysis spanned five national elections: 1966,
1969, 1972, 1974 and 1975 and it was necessary to ensure that
both political and demographic variables related to the same
boundaries for these elections. The demographic data had been
made available based on the 1968 boundaries, so these were the
political boundaries chosen. This meant that the 1966 election
results had to be re-allocated to 1968 boundaries for all seats.
The 1969, 1972, 1974 and 1975 election results then remained
unchanged for all states except Western Australia where the
1974 and 1975 results were re-allocated back to the 1968
boundaries. For the Territories, the NT obviously remained
unaffected, but the Australian Capital Territory was split into
two politically-identical electorates for all elections from
1966 to 1972; from 1974 the new boundaries were used.

The two-party preferred votes were calculated on the basis of
actual distributions within the relevant state at the appropriate
election. Leakages to the ALP therefore varied from State to
State and election to election.

The average 2PP vote for all seats was the simple average for
the five elections from 1966 to 1972.

The swings were the result of simple subtraction, 1966-69 was
the 1969 result minus the 1966 result, and so on.

The direction of swing was therefore positive if it was towards
the Labor Party, and negative if the movement was away from the
ALP. So a positive correlation between swings in V7 to V10 and
demographic variables indicated a swing towards Labor amongst
these demographic groups.

The final variable, V11, was slightly different. The aim was
to obtain a measure of swing which was independent of the
direction of swing from one election to the next. When
looking at swing in electorates in the longer term, I was
not interested in the direction of swing at any one election,
but the absolute value of the swing, averaged out over the four
swing periods analysed: 1966-69, 1969-72, 1972-74 and 1974-75.
Therefore I took the absolute swing for each of these four
events, added the four figures and divided by four. These
figures were listed in the results as positive, so that a positive
correlation between V11 and any demographic variable indicated
a potential source of long-term electoral volatility (at least
between 1966 and 1975).

The political variables are listed below, with the corresponding
variable number which appears in the results' sheets:

1. ALP Vote House of Reps Election 1966 (2 Party Preferred Basis)
2.   "   "   "   "   "   "   1969 "   "   "   "
3.   "   "   "   "   "   "   1972 "   "   "   "
4.   "   "   "   "   "   "   1974 "   "   "   "
5.   "   "   "   "   "   "   1975 "   "   "   "
6. Average Labor Vote 1966-1975 (2 P.P.)
7. Swing to A.L.P. 1966-69
8.   "   "   "   1969-72
9.   "   "   "   1972-74
10.   "   "   "   1974-75
11. Average size of swing 1966-75 (i.e. average absolute change in
    voting percentage regardless of direction of swing).

The Method of Analysis

The method of analysis used was similar to that employed for
the South Australian project and described in detail in the
Appendix to that project.

Firstly, Pearson Correlations or Pearson rs, were obtained to
measure the relationships between political variables V1 to
V11 and the demographic variables V12 to V217. A strong
relationship or link can be measured by the closeness of the
Pearson r to plus or minus one. A positive sign indicates a
positive relationship and a negative sign indicates a negative
(or inverse) relationship. As the Pearson r approaches zero,
the measured relationship becomes increasingly weaker.

Next came the Multiple Regression analysis. This procedure
chooses the variable with the strongest Pearson r as its starting
point and calculates the variance in the political variable
explained by this first demographic variable. This information
is listed on the first line of the regression table. The
computer program then calculates a completely new set of Partial
correlations (not listed in the results) which control for the
variance already explained by the strongest correlation. The
computer chooses the strongest Partial Correlation from the new
list and calculates the additional amount of variance in the
political (or dependent) variable explained by this demographic
(or independent) variable. This is listed in the second line
in the Multiple Regression tables. The computer then repeats
the whole process, allowing for the variance explained by the first
two demographic variables chosen. In this way the third and sub-
sequent lines of the regression tables are obtained.

An example of the uses to which this methodology can be put is
provided by consideration of the Greek orthodox religious variable.
You don't have to be a statistical expert to realise that the
strong positive relationship between adherents of the Greek
Orthodox faith and the Labor vote is due almost entirely to the
fact that followers of the Greek Orthodox faith are overwhelmingly
Greek-born persons. This is the sort of calculation employed in
a routine way by the Multiple Regression program which takes the

obvious process one step further and calculates to what extent
a pro-Labor vote amongst Greek-born persons is due to the fact
that these persons in Australia tend to be employed in working-
class jobs.

Once class factors are considered the ethnic and religious
significance of the Greeks disappears. The same sort of situa-
tion occurs with working-class Irish Catholics. The regression
technique dissects and analyses these sorts of interrelationsips
and assigns a weighting (the amount of variance explained) to
the significance of each factor as a predictor of the Labor vote.

An important aside should be inserted here to confirm the use-
fulness of the Pearson rs. They may not be terribly useful to
explain possible causes of voting intention, but they certainly
do provide a useful description of the voting patterns of different
groups.

There is, to continue with the Greek example given above, a strong
positive relationship between Greek-born persons and Labor voters.
Put more simply and in a statistically-improper fashion: Greek-
born persons vote Labor. But they vote Labor because they are
working class. So if you want to explain why they vote the way
they do, their ethnic origins are statistically irrelevant. But
if you were a market researcher with limited resources trying to
target advertisements towards Labor voters (or if you were a
Labor candidate trying to ensure all potential Labor voters were
enrolled) you could do a lot worse than to aim your campaign at
easily-identified Greek-born persons via Greek-language newspapers
(for the market researcher) or easily-identified Greek suburbs
or streets (for the Labor candidate).

The final stage of the computer analysis for the present project involves the calculation of predicted and residual votes and swings for all electorates and the comparison of these predictions with the actual or observed votes.

The program allows for this by weighting all the demographic variables listed in the Multiple Regression Tables and adding a constant to form a simple arithmetic equation consisting entirely of demographic variables which when combined in the manner described in the Regression Equations, predicts the Labor vote.

If we take the South Australian Project as an example of this, we can see from the 1975 Adelaide city Multiple Regression Table (Table 1.7) that more than 90 percent of the variance in the Labor vote was due to factors relating to occupational class. This went further than simply stating that strong working-class electorates usually return Labor candidates. It assigned a predicted Labor vote for all urban seats based on the 1975 voting patterns and stated that there was a 95 percent chance that the observed Labor vote in any seat should have been within about 7.2 percent of the predicted result. The result obtained by subtracting the predicted vote from the observed vote is called the residual and the South Australian 1975 Regression Equation told us that if any electorate had returned a residual in 1975 larger than plus or minus 7.2 percent then factors exogenous to the demographic variables under consideration almost certainly (a 95 percent probability) were responsible. These exogenous factors could have been demographic variables not considered in the S.A. analysis, regional or geographic factors, a high donkey vote or informal vote, an atypical distribution of preferences from a minor party candidate, or most importantly, the presence of an unpopular or popular Labor candidate. These exogenous factors in Adelaide in 1975 could however only explain 6.8 percent of the variance in the Labor vote, whereas the demographic variables (overwhelmingly class-based) explained 93.2 percent.

A positive residual   indicates that the Observed Labor
Vote for the relevant seat was higher than the Predicted Vote.
The higher the residual, the better the result for Labor in that
seat. The reverse of course applies for negative residuals.

In addition to the Pearson r Tables, the Multiple Regression
Tables and the Residual Tables, I produced some simple bar
charts which illustrate visually the strength of the Pearson rs
for almost all variables.

The results

In this results section I present only a portion
of the total results actually obtained. The complete results
covered some 1000 pages of computer printout and dealt with
not just the national analysis results summarised here, but
analyses of individual electorate behaviour within states,
and analyses of Senate voting patterns using the states rather
than electorates as the units of analysis. The value of these
subsequent analyses were however of marginal value and provide
pretty eye-glazing reading for all but the obsessive psephologist.

I repeat: the results summarised here relate to the "all-in"
national analysis in which all 1968 Federal electorates were
considered together in the same computer run. Exogenous factors
which therefore contribute to the unexplained variance with this
national analysis include not just the local electorate campaign
and the local candidate, but also regional and state-based factors
dealing with the composition and popularity of the respective
state Governments and the effectiveness of the campaigns waged by
the respective State Labor Branches.

The results are contained in six major groups and each group is
split into four sections. The four sections are as follows: the
top 26 Pearson correlations between the political and demographic
variables; Pearson r bar charts which illustrate the relative
strengths of each Pearson r; the Multiple Regression Tables and
Regression Equations; and the Observed, Predicted and Residual
votes for each electorate.

The six groups are as follows: The average vote between 1966
and 1975 and the absolute average swing between 1966 and 1975;
the 1966 vote and the 1966 to 1969 swing; the 1969 vote and the
1969 to 1972 swing; the 1972 vote and the 1972 to 1974 swing;
the 1974 vote and the 1974 to 1975 swing; and the 1975 vote.

The reader can get a good summary of each election and
swing from the pearson correlation tables; the bar
chart figures provide a much more detailed picture;
while the multiple regression tables allow some
conclusions about the dynamics of the interaction
between demographic variables and the vote and swing,
and also between the demographic variables themselves.

The residuals permit some interpretation of variations
in Labor's performance across seats, regions and states.

Discussion A.

V6 - 1966-75 2PP Mean Vote
V11 - 1966-75 Absolute Mean Swing

Table 2.3 highlights the strength of occupational class
across the nation as a means of locating Labor voters.
The Pearson Correlation Tables in this project list the
top 26 correlates for each political variable and we can
see clearly in table 2.3 the dominance of class-related
factors over other demographic variables. Of these top 26
correlations some 18 relate either directly or indirectly
to occupational class.

The top correlation is V177 - the Males Craftsmen variable
(described in some detail in the methodology). This variable
is similar to the "Blue Collar Worker" of project one and
includes tradesmen, production and process workers and
laborers - the persons normally belonging to ALP-affiliated
unions. The Pearson r of .78 is extremely high for a national
analysis which includes every Australian electorate and con-
sequently a high degree of regional diversity.

The next strongest positive correlation is the female
equivalent of V177 - V189. Why is the female equivalent
discernibly lower in terms of its support for Labor? The
answer to this will have to await the presentation of a
great deal more empirical evidence, although it is interest-
ing to note that younger women workers (V137) appear to
support Labor more strongly than men.

Yugoslavs and Greek Orthodox variables also make it into the
top positive correlates, but the reader should be warned -
we later learn that this is evidence merely of strong links
between southern Europeans and working-class jobs.

On the negative side for Labor, we find Males Employers
(-.73), then Female Employers (-.63). Evidence is already

PEARSON R TABLE

Political Variable - V6 2PP VOTE
1966-75 MEAN

PEARSON R	DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
+.78	V177 MALES - CRAFTSMEN
+.55	V189 FEMALES - CRAFTSMEN
+.54	V176 MALES - TRANSPORT WORKERS
+.52	V 72 YUGOSLAVIAN BORN
+.51	V166 MALES - TRADE
+.50	V137 FEMALES - WORKFORCE 15-19 YEARS
+.48	V162 MALES - EMPLOYEES
+.45	V 48 GREEK AND OTHER ORTHODOX
-.45	V 88 HOUSEWIVES - FULL-TIME
-.46	V174 MALES - FARMERS
-.47	V188 MALES - NON-DEGREE TERTIARY
-.47	V147 FEMALES - WORKFORCE - 65 YEARS AND OVER
-.49	V171 MALES - ADMINISTRATIVE
-.50	V122 FEMALES - TECHNICIANS
-.51	V186 FEMALES - FARMERS
-.51	V 52 PRESBYTERIAN
-.53	V163 MALES - HELPERS
-.54	V158 PERSONS - WORKFORCE - 65 YEARS AND OVER
-.55	V123 FEMALES - NON-DEGREE TERTIARY
-.56	V161 MALES - SELF-EMPLOYED
-.57	V217 HOMES WITH 2 CARS
-.58	V136 MALES - 65 YEARS AND OVER
-.58	V195 FEMALES - "HOME DUTIES" (PART-TIME WORKERS)
-.63	V166 FEMALES - SELF-EMPLOYED
-.63	V165 FEMALES - EMPLOYERS
-.73	V160 MALES - EMPLOYERS

TABLE 2.3 (V6)

appearing here to suggest that Females in equivalent
occupation groups (Craftsmen and Employers) exhibit less
polarised class-voting attitudes than Males.

Reading up from the bottom of the table we see that male and
female self-employed persons are reasonably similar (a
difference of .07) and we also notice the appearance of a
curious group of women who are housewives in terms of their
usual major activity and yet who state that they work part-
time on a regular basis.

Why is this group so hostile to Labor? A closer examination
of the data indicates this variable is larger in safe
Liberal and Country Party electorates and without drawing on
all the available results here and in other documents, it
appears that this variable is distorted by the presence of a
substantial number of housewives who work part-time only
"on paper" to provide taxation benefits for their husbands
who were likely to be professional men in the city and farmers
in the country. This "distortion" was enough to render V195
an unreliable guide to voting intentions of housewives who
genuinely worked part-time.

Looking further up the table we see males aged 65 and over
who had either retired or who were still in the workforce
(presumably on high salaries). Also we have the female and
male persons with non-degree Tertiary qualifications. This
is a particularly hostile electoral group for Labor.

We see also homes with two-plus cars - an affluent group
in both the city and country - and Presbyterians - the
rural middle class.

Nothing else is really very startling about the remaining
non-Labor groups. The Female Farmers group bears some
relation to the suspect variable 195 mentioned above and
may also have had some minor distorting affect on V88 -
full-time housewives (which includes those full-time

housewives who work part-time). The fact remains however,
that V88 was a potent and large (about 42 percent of the
total female population) anti-Labor group between 1966 and
1975. Housewives, for as yet unknown reasons, certainly
didn't support Labor between 1966 and 1975.

At this stage I will make a few general points about
different behaviour patterns between the sexes.

It is beyond the scope of this report to deal in adequate
detail with a full discussion of the complex interrelation-
ships between women, the child-birth and child-rearing
cycles, the departure from and re-entry to the workforce
by women, and a host of demographic variables relating to
age, number of children, education, ethnicity and the
availability of full-time and part-time work for women.
However the following notes should help the reader interpret
the relevant results.

*Firstly, women in paid employment are concentrated in a
"pink-collar" ghetto, in low skill, low-paid occupations
with poor expectations about prospects and careers.

*Young women with poor education get stuck with the boring
jobs. They marry earlier than better-educated women; they
also leave work sooner and have more children sooner than
better-educated women. Better-educated women in Australia
if I can use the South African term which is pretty approp-
riate in the circumstances, can be considered to be in
receipt of "honorary male" status.

*Working women are much more likely to be employed in the
more politically conservative white-collar areas than men;
they are also more likely to work part-time; they are more
likely to be unemployed; if they are married they are faced
with great difficulty finding suitable employment after their
children have started school.

*Working women also receive much lower weekly pay cheques
than men, partly because of the higher level of part-time
work among women, but also because women receive fewer
above-award payments, and of course less overtime. In
addition women workers are concentrated in occupations
(clerical, service and sales) where the average weekly
earnings are below the average rates for all occupations
and yet persons - both male and female - in these occupations
tend to be anti-Labor.[1] Women who are employed in the higher-
status occupation groups (professional and technical) tend
to be in the lower-paid teaching and nursing jobs.

Simple comparisons of the political behaviour of women and
men in "identical" groups are made even more suspect by the
use of wives by their husbands to minimise tax liabilities.

*The most obvious examples are family companies where farmers,
urban professionals and small businessmen are joined by their
wives as nominal fellow-employers. A simpler case is where
the housewife is allegedly paid a salary by the husband to
perform secretarial duties for his farm or business. In
the first case the wife would be listed in the census as
a full-time female employer or a housewife who works part-
time, and in the second case she would be listed either as
a female full-time white-collar employee or again as a house-
wife who works part-time. In all three cases the female
should have been classified in the non-working home-duties
group.

*Two of the three above cases would include many women who
were reported in the census to be housewives who worked
part-time. (This was the variable 195 mentioned earlier.)

I believe that the present results as they relate to the
political behaviour of housewives and working wives appear
a little worse than they really are for Labor because of
this interraction between taxation returns and the census
forms. This is because the method of computer analysis used

---

1. Labor's vote improved in this area however between
    1966-80.

will measure the politically polarised behaviour of the
smaller sub-group if it is both large enough and sufficiently
polarised to have an impact on the larger variable in which
it is included.

To sum up: All the results relating to women in the work-
force should be treated with caution. Simple comparisons
with men in apparently identical sub-groups invite trouble
because the female workforce is so different to the male
workforce. In addition, the current analysis presents the
behaviour of the female workforce in an artificially negative
way because what we are really measuring to a certain extent
is the political behaviour of these women's husbands, most
of whom would be anti-Labor.

<p style="text-align:center">✗   ✗   ✗</p>

The next Pearson R table (2.4) seeks to identify long-run
swinging voters - a group which is much more difficult to
define than Labor voters.

The general trends however, are very clear. If we start
first with the bottom portion of the table we can see the
complete dominance of stable voters by the age groups 50
and over. There are only three variables here not directly
related to age and all three of these have strong indirect
links with the elderly.

*Variable 86 is dominated by persons who have retired and
are in receipt of superannuation payments.

*Variable 82 primarily identifies aged migrants (and to a
lesser extent the upwardly mobile migrant).

*Variable 114 is strongly related to older and more con-
servative rural age groups, particularly farmers.

So this bottom portion of the second major table clearly
supports one of the major findings of the South Australian
project: Older persons (especially those over 55) represent

PEARSON R TABLE

Political Variable - V11 2PP

MEAN SWING 1966-75

PEARSON R	DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
+.35	V197 RENTED S.H.A. HOUSES
+.34	V209 HOMES TENANT S.H.A.
+.34	V 61 BRITISH AND IRISH BORN
+.33	V 69 DUTCH BORN
+.32	V 33 FEMALES - 30 TO 34 YEARS
+.31	V191 FEMALES - ARMED SERVICES
+.29	V 80 O'SEAS BORN - 5 TO 9 YEARS IN AUSTRALIA
+.28	V 64 GERMAN BORN
+.27	V 34 FEMALES - 35 TO 39 YEARS
+.27	V216 HOMES WITH 1 CAR
+.26	V 32 FEMALES - 25 TO 29 YEARS
+.25	V214 HOMES WITH T.V.
-.25	V 40 FEMALES - 65 TO 69 YEARS
-.25	V114 MALES - NEVER ATTENDED SCHOOL
-.26	V136 MALES - WORKFORCE - 65 YEARS AND OVER
-.26	V 37 FEMALES - 50 TO 54 YEARS
-.27	V134 MALES - WORKFORCE - 55 TO 59 YEARS
-.28	V 82 O'SEAS BORN - 17+ YEARS IN AUSTRALIA
-.28	V 39 FEMALES - 60 TO 64 YEARS
-.28	V 38 FEMALES - 55 TO 59 YEARS
-.29	V 86 MALES - OTHERS (USUAL MAJOR ACTIVITY)
-.29	V 25 MALES - 65 TO 69 YEARS
-.29	V 26 MALES - 70 YEARS AND OVER
-.30	V 23 MALES - 55 TO 59 YEARS
-.31	V135 MALES - WORKFORCE - 60 TO 64 YEARS
-.34	V 24 MALES - 60 TO 64 YEARS

TABLE 2.4 (V11)

the most easily identifiable stable electoral group in
Australia.

If we are searching for volatile voters then, we are
looking firstly at all persons under the age of 50. To
focus more clearly on this group we now examine the top
portion of table 2.4.

Here we can see four distinct demographic groupings:

1. Public Housing tenants.
2. The UK and Western Europe migrant bloc (British, Dutch
    and German-born) plus migrants with five to nine years'
    residency.
3. Females aged from 25 to 39.
4. Homes with one car and a television set ("Kingswood
    Country").

I won't go into a detailed description of these groups here;
that will be dealt with in the latter stages of the report.
But four points should be made.

Firstly, three of the four groups are found overwhelmingly
in urban areas (the exception is Females 25-39).

Secondly, it seems that the South Australian results relating
to public housing tenancy and more importantly, the age of
swinging voters, have been confirmed.

Thirdly, the present results have minimised the influence
of males in the volatile 25-39 age group, something that was
not possible with S.A. data which took no note of sex dif-
ferences. This 25-39 age group for females includes the
cycle in which females leave the workforce, have their
children, and then return to the workforce.

Fourthly, the period of residency of overseas-born persons
certainly warrants closer examination. If this period-of-
residency variable is independent of the age of the general

population, then it raises a number of interesting questions about the long-term electoral implications for Labor of migrant voting behaviour.

* * *

Now our attention turns to the bar-chart figures 2.1 to
2.9.

Firstly, 2.1 shows the relationship between age and the
mean Labor vote 1966-75, and age and absolute mean swings
between 1966 and 1975. With the aid of this figure we
can easily compare male (shaded bars) and female (clear
bars) Pearson correlations for similar and adjoining age
groups.

The top portion of figure 2.1 shows the level of support
for Labor dropping into the negative area beyond the age
of 49 years. There are some interesting sex differences
in evidence, with females (clear bars) supporting Labor
to a much greater degree until the marrying age of 25,
when they drop progressively further and further below
males until the age of 50. Then this gap slowly narrows
until the age of 60, when females again exhibit more sup-
port for Labor than males.

The bottom portion of figure 2.1 dealing with electoral
volatility shows females behaving in a reasonably similar
fashion to males except for the 25-39 year age group.
Ignoring this very important exception for the moment,
we can see a relatively neutral population for the younger
groups up to age 24, a very volatile 25-44 age group, and
a neutral 45-49 age group which precedes the stable age
groups aged 50 years and over.

If we now look back at the group aged 25-44, we can
clearly see the peak in male electoral volatility between
the ages of 30 and 39. For the females, this peak is
higher and it is reached at an earlier age: 30-34. For
25-29 year olds we can also see remarkable differences
in the volatility between males and females, with the
female group reaching a Pearson correlation of +.26 com-
pared to the male group's +.08. I think this five-year

2 PP VOTE: 1966→75 MEAN   4·11

2 PP SWING: 66→75 MEAN SWING

Figure 2.1

AGE

MALES - SHADED

FEMALES - CLEAR

"lag effect" for females is due partly to the fact that
many females are married to males in the adjoining older
age groups.

Before commenting on this very significant result, I
turn to figure 2.2. (The reader should be wary of the
fact that the scale of Pearson correlations is larger
for this and subsequent figures.)

Looking at the top portion of figure 2.2 we can see a much
greater level of support for Labor among young workers
aged 15-19 than for the total population in this age
group (see figure 2.1) with an extremely high level of
support for Labor from working females in this 15-19 age
group. For the next group, aged 20-24, we can see, however,
that the sex-vote position for the 20-24 year olds in the
workforce is the reverse of that for the total population
(see figure 2.1). This would infer that the females aged
20-24 not in the workforce are an extremely strong pro-
Labor group indeed, certainly much stronger than for males
in the same age group.

Now I direct the reader to the bottom portion of figure
2.2. Here we can see that females across working age
groups tend to be more volatile than their male co-workers
(except for the group aged 30-34).

We can also see that the marked superiority of female
over male volatility for the key population age groups
25-39 has disappeared to virtually nothing for the groups
aged 25-29 and 35-39 and has actually been reversed for
the key 30-34 age group. Again, we can tell by omission
that the 30-34 year old females not in the workforce must
have accounted for all the increased female volatility
seen for this group in table 2.1.

I will discuss this key 30-34 year old female group later
in the report and provide a complete profile of it in

On the chart:

$r \geq .25; p \leq .001 (\leq 0.1\%)$
$r = .20; p = .01 (1\%)$
$r = .14; p = .05 (5\%)$
$r = .11; p = .10 (10\%)$

Left axis (top to bottom): PRO-LABOR VOTE: +1.00, +.8, +.6, +.4, +.2, 0, ANTI-LABOR VOTE: .2, .4, .6, .8, 1.00

Right axis labels: 0.1%, 1%, 5%, 10% (above 0); 10%, 5%, 1%, 0.1% (below 0)

Figure 2.10

LEVELS OF SIGNIF-
ICANCE.

Figure shows levels of significance
for the bar chart figures. The exact
figures are: r of .11 gives p of
10%; .14 gives 5%; .20 gives 1% and
.25 and above gives less than 0.1%.
This "p" figure quantifies in
percentage terms the probability
that the corresponding "r" occurred
due to chance or error. The greater
the "r" the more this probability
of error recedes.
The reader should also note that
the scale on the Age figures is
double that for the other groups.

Figure 2.2

AGE OF THE WORK-
FORCE

MALES—SHADED
FEMALES—CLEAR

terms of the other   demographic variables, but the obvious point will be made here that currently female participation in the workforce drops from about 70 percent for 20-24 year olds to about 50 percent for women aged 25-34. It then climbs back up to 57 percent for 35-44 year olds, before dropping back slowly to about 26 percent for 55-59 year old women. (See table 2.5 below.)

So the key volatile voters (as far as sex, age, and age of the workforce are concerned) are females not in the workforce aged 25-39 and especially 30-34 year olds who have left the workforce to become involved in the family child-birth and early child-rearing cycle.

I also provide here figure 2.11 which summarises the information on figure 2.1 into a single graph. The points on the graph represent the mid-points of both male and female Pearson correlations for the different age groups. Using this graph it is possible to identify three groups by increasing age. Firstly, we have 15-24 and 45-49 year olds - stable pro-Labor groups.

Secondly, we have the 25-44 year olds - a volatile pro-Labor group (especially among women not in the workforce).

Thirdly, to the right of the graph, we have persons aged 50 and over - a stable conservative group.

Here we can see at once the demographic problem for Labor in Australia: most of Labor's potential support has to come from volatile voters, whereas the non-Labor parties have a stable anti-Labor base one-third as large as that which exists for Labor. Taking the 1976 Census and its potential electoral base of persons aged 18 and over (ignoring non-citizens) we can see that the distribution of these key age groups is as follows:

18-24 and 45-49 year olds	25.7%	(stable pro-Labor)
25-44 year olds	39.8%	(volatile pro-Labor)
50+ year olds	34.5%	(stable anti-Labor)

LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES BY AGE GROUP
MALES AND FEMALES, AUGUST 1979

	Males	Females
	☐	▨

AGE GROUP

15—19 years
Males 61.4%
Females 55.0%
100%

20—24
Males 90.3%
Females 69.2%

25—34
Males 95.8%
Females 50.4%

35—44
Males 95.6%
Females 57.1%

45—54
Males 91.2%
Females 46.8%

55—59
Males 81.9%
Females 26.1%

60—64
Males 53.5%
Females 13.2%

65+
Males 11.5%
Females 2.4%

TOTAL
Males 77.8%
Females 42.9%

Based on statistics contained in:
ABS, The Labour Force, August 1979

TABLE 2.5

4.17

Figure 2.11

AGE BY STABILITY
AND VOTE.

Therefore, in order to win more than 50 percent of the
total vote, Labor has to attract the support of more than
61 percent of the 25-44 year olds, whereas the non-Labor
parties only need to win more than 39 percent.

If the 25-44 year olds split down the middle, Labor would
have 45.6 percent of the National preferred vote compared
to non-Labor's 54.4 percent - an uncomfortably familiar
result since World War II. (See table 2.6 below.)

	ELECTION	A.L.P. 2 P.P.	NON-A.L.P. 2 P.P.
1.	46	53.9	46.1
2.	49	48.6	51.4
3.	51	49.2	50.8
4.	54	50.9	49.1
5.	55	46.2	53.8
6.	58	45.9	54.1
7.	61	50.5	49.5
8.	63	47.4	52.6
9.	66	43.1	56.9
10.	69	50.2	49.8
11.	72	52.7	47.3
12.	74	51.7	48.3
13.	75	44.3	55.7
14.	77	45.4	54.5
15.	80	49.6	50.4
	MEAN 46 - 80	48.6	51.4

TABLE 2.6

Once it wins Government, Labor then has to contend with
the fact that a much greater proportion of its winning
majority is subject to electoral erosion than if it were
a non-Labor Government.

This 39.8 percent figure for 25-44 year olds is, of course, a gross over-estimate of the actual number of long-run swinging voters in the electoral community, but the general demographic background to Labor's electoral problems outlined above would nevertheless go part of the way to explain why Labor's vote since the Second World War has often fallen down near the 43-44 percent mark, whereas the non-Labor preferred vote has never fallen below 47.3 percent since 1949. (See table 2.6.)

*　　　*　　　*

In the top portion of figure 2.3 we can clearly see the
strong bases of support for the three major political
parties, with the Liberals gaining the Professional and
Administrative groups and male Sales workers, the Country
Party picking up the Farmers and Labor getting its support
from workers in Mining (males), Transport (males), Craftsmen
(including Production, Process workers and Laborers), the
Service industries, the "Others" and the Unemployed (males).

Non-aligned groups include Clerical workers (male and female),
Sales workers (female), female Miners (a virtually non-
existent group), female Transport workers (a tiny group),
the Armed Services and the female Unemployed. The only
reasonably sized groups here of any significance are the
Clerical workers (of both sexes), female Sales workers, male
members of the Armed Services and the female Unemployed.

I think the most important facts to be noted from this
portion of figure 2.3 are the less-polarised nature of the
female worker and the political neutrality of Clerical
workers and female Sales workers. This neutrality certainly
works to Labor's advantage with female Sales workers being
much less conservative than their (reasonably comparable)
male counterparts.

This neutrality in terms of the class-vote relationship
does not, ipso facto, imply electoral volatility, as we
can see from the bottom portion of figure 2.3, which reveals
the relative weakness of a class-based model of electoral
volatility.

A handful of occupation variables just sneak into the
acceptable range of significance. The volatile groups are:
Clerical workers and female Sales workers. The female Army
group is so tiny it can be ignored.

The stable groups are: Farmers, male Miners, male Transport

2PP VOTE: 1966-75 MEAN. 4.21

2PP SWING: 66→75 MEAN SWING

PROF. ADMIN. CLER. SALES FARM. MINE. TRANS. CRAFT. SERV. ARMY. OTHER. UNEM.

Figure 2.3

OCCUPATION

MALES — SHADED
FEMALES — CLEAR

workers and male "Others." The "Others" includes some
of the more esoteric-occupation groups such as diplomats
and "others" the statistician found too difficult to
categorise.

Figure 2.4 is divided into three parts. From left to
right we have Usual Major Activity, Qualifications and
Occupational Status. I will discuss each part (top and
bottom) briefly in turn. For the major activity section
we see that the workers were generally pro-Labor and
neutral in terms of volatility; housewives (there were
no househusbands in 1971) were anti-Labor and stable; and
the "other" group - a very mixed bag including students and
pensioners - were politically neutral and stable.

In the Qualifications section in the top portion of the
figure we can see the only area of support for Labor (this
section excludes those with no qualifications - a large
group) is among the tradesmen.

The tradeswomen group is very small and would include some
white-collar occupations. All of those with qualifications
including and above the Technician's Certificate were anti-
Labor. This was especially noticeable for females with
technical qualifications. Interestingly, we see here a trend
towards decreasing anti-Labor bias among those with higher
standards of tertiary education. (See also figure 2.5.) In
the bottom portion of the figure we can see that the only
volatile group of any political significance (and then only
just) is the group of male Technicians. Those persons with
degrees and higher degrees are only a small percentage of the
workforce (about four to five percent) and the correlations
for these variables are barely significant.

The third part of the figure holds few surprises. The
three groups - employers, self-employed and helpers (unpaid
assistants) - are all anti-Labor and stable while employees
are pro-Labor but neutral in terms of volatility.

Figure 2.4
MAJOR ACTIVITY:
QUALIFICATIONS:
OCCUP. STATUS.
MALES - SHADED
FEMALES - CLEAR

The education bar-charts for both sexes in figure 2.5
contain some interesting trends, although the levels of
significance are marginal.

In the top portion of the figure, if we ignore the parents
of pre-schoolers, school children and persons who had never
attended school (this last group is weakly aligned with
Labor), then we can see what appears to be a bi-modal
distribution of support for Labor, with significant sex
differences. The general trend is for Labor's support
to be distributed in a flat standard-normal fashion across
grades one to nine, with the peak occurring at about
grade four. Support for Labor then increases remarkably
for grade ten graduates (intermediate levels) and falls
through a neutral position for grade 11 (leaving) to an
anti-Labor position for grade 12 graduates (matriculation).
In almost all cases (except for grade 10) the females are
more/in their party loyalties than males in the corresponding
groups.

The bottom portion of figure 2.5 shows <u>parents</u> of pre-school
and school-age children (parents in the 25-44 age group) to
be volatile, while those who had never attended school were
quite stable.

For those voters <u>who had attended school</u> (not parents) we
can see that both sexes were quite stable up to and including
grade nine graduates, while the remaining high school grad-
uates appear to have been mildly predisposed towards greater
electoral volatility during 1966 to 1975.

In both portions of the figure we can see qualitative
changes in the political behaviour of voters who had
attended high school past first-year levels.

In figure 2.6 we can see two factors at work: migrants
tend to go into working-class jobs and vote Labor; and
migrants lack the generational stability of Australian-born

2 PP VOTE: 1966 → 75 MEAN   4.25

2PP SWING: 66 → 75 MEAN SWING

Figure 2.5

EDUCATION

MALES — SHADED

FEMALES — CLEAR

voters (parents' influence) and tend to be electorally
volatile.

I won't comment on every group in the top portion of the
figure. The bars are simple enough to follow and the
reader can easily see the interaction between the proportion
of working-class migrants in the various ethnic groups since
post World War II migration began, and the varying degrees
of support for Labor. The Regression Analysis discussed
later clearly demonstrates the significance of this class
factor (relative to ethnicity) as the dominant factor to
be considered.

A few points, however, should be made:
Firstly, the strongest anti-Labor group is the Australian-
born. This is, of course, a relative rather than an absolute
figure. Other anti-Labor groups include New Zealanders,
Canadians and migrants from the U.S.A. I don't have any
evidence to back this up, but I would have thought that
these last two groups would have included a majority of
skilled and professional persons.

The strongest pro-Labor groups are the Yugoslavs, the
Maltese and migrants from the other smaller European
countries not specifically listed. The period of residence
variables also in the top portion of the figure reveal an
interesting decline in support for Labor amongst migrants,
all of which we later learn is explained by class-related
factors presumably linked to period of residence by inter-
mediate variables such as increasing age and promotions into
                    the self-employed or employer ranks.

When we examine the lower portion of the figure dealing
with electoral volatility we see four main groups which are
discernibly more volatile than the others: U.K.-born,
Germans, Dutch and all migrants who have lived in Australia
between five and nine years. There is a large degree of

2 PP VOTE: 1966→75 MEAN   4.27

2 PP SWING: 66→75 MEAN SWING

Figure 2.6

ETHNICITY

spatial compatibility between these first three groups
(they live in the same sorts of suburbs). The last group
is really quite interesting, especially when we see that
persons of 17 years' or more residence in Australia, are
even more stable than the Australian-born.

Although this period-of-residence factor was not found to
be a significant variable in its own right, I think it is
nevertheless of some importance to note that in any con-
sideration of ethnicity, migrants who have lived in
Australia between five and nine years are among the most vol-
atile groups, while those who have lived in this country for
17 or more years comprise the most stable ethnic group. In
political terms, this period-of-residence factor is more
important than the country of birth of migrants.

<p style="text-align:center">*   *   *</p>

Religion: Figure 2.7 shows the levels of support for
Labor and the varying degrees of volatility of the different
religious groups. All figures are self-explanatory, none
are of any real significance as measures of volatility and
all are later eliminated in the later National Regression
Analysis as being of no significance in their own right.

All credible discussion of religion that I have read deals
with church-going, rather than religion per se, as the
dominant factor explaining the relationship between religion
and voting. The present national results confirmed this,
with one very minor qualification. When writing this portion
of the discussion, I rechecked the state-based Regression
Analysis for Victoria to see if I could find any relationship
between Catholicity and the Labor vote. I expected to find
some evidence of a drift back to Labor from Catholics in the
late sixties and early seventies commensurate with the de-
cline of the D.L.P. In fact this was the case to a very
minor degree between 1969 and 1972, when Catholicity explained

2 PP VOTE: 1966→75 MEAN   4.29

2 PP SWING: 66→75 MEAN SWING

Figure 2.7

RELIGION

a tiny 1.9 percent of variance in the pro-Labor swing within Victoria. It was, of course, a positive factor.

Nationally however, religion was of no political significance between 1966 and 1975.

*   *   *

Figure 2.8 (Housing): These figures tell us that persons who live in rented state housing authority (S.H.A.) houses or flats were pro-Labor. This is hardly new, but the figure also describes how the cost of this rented public housing has some impact on the Labor vote in these areas. The residents of higher-cost S.H.A. rented houses (shown as $ rent S.H.A. houses in the top part of the figure) vote anti-Labor. The residents of higher-cost S.H.A. rented flats ($ rent S.H.A. flats) are still a pro-Labor group, but less markedly so than the average tenant of a S.H.A. flat.

From the bottom portion of the figure we can see significantly volatile groups living in rented S.H.A. houses, higher-cost rented furnished private houses (seventh column from the left) and higher-cost "other" (non-furnished) rented houses and flats.

In part, this volatility would have to be a function of the age distribution of home renters, who would tend to be in the volatile age groups described earlier.

The next figure (2.9) presents the results on its left-hand side for variables which are very similar to those for figure 2.8. These results confirm the conclusions reached for figure 2.8 and they also show us that home owners (an older and more affluent group) were moderately anti-Labor and reasonably neutral in terms of volatility between 1966 and 1975.

2 PP SWING: 66→75 MEAN SWING

Figure 2.8

HOUSING

2PP SWING: 66 → 75 MEAN SWING.

Figure 2.9

HOUSING: CARS: TV

The final right-hand side of figure 2.9 tells us residents of homes with television sets (in 1971) were neutral in terms of their average support for Labor between 1966 and 1975 and yet were electorally volatile. Residents of homes with no cars (older and poorer inner-city areas) were pro-Labor and electorally stable. Residents of homes with one car (down-market suburbia) were neutral in terms of their vote, but volatile, while residents of homes with two or more cars (farmers and wealthy urban dwellers) were strongly anti-Labor voters, but electorally neutral.

In my judgment, the 1971 homes with television receivers and one car tended to be "Kingswood Country" - a sort of middle-to-lower-market suburbia.

$$*\qquad*\qquad*$$

Now we come to the real substance of the long-run analysis of vote and swing - the Multiple Regression Equations and their derived predicted votes and residuals.

In tables 2.7 and 2.8 we see the computer's summary of all the Pearson correlation evidence contained in the preceding tables and figures. The first point to note from table 2.7 is the enormous predicting power of occupational class across the nation. The first three variables in the regression equation all deal with occupational class: male Craftsmen, male Sales workers and female Farmers.

What a delightfully simple and yet illustrative picture of a decade of Australian electoral behaviour has been explained with three simple lines of one table. Here we can see the degree to which the large Craftsmen variable explains the Labor vote in all electorates. This variable accounted for about 45 percent of the male workforce in 1971. It was also distributed across all electorates in a reasonably standard fashion. So there is nothing atypical or "flukey" about this result, whereby this single variable explains 61.2 percent of the average Labor 2 P.P. vote over a decade in

VARIABLE NUMBER	DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND REGRESSION EQUATION (BELOW)	VARIANCE EXPLAINED (%)	EXTRA VARIANCE EXPLAINED (%)	SIGN OF COEFFICIENT AND CONSTANT
177	MALES - CRAFTSMEN	61.2	61.2	+
173	MALES - SALES	66.8	5.6	−
186	FEMALES - FARMERS	78.0	11.2	−
118	MALES - NON-DEGREE TERTIARY	81.5	3.5	−
177	DELETED	81.1	−	
20	MALES - 40 to 44 YEARS	82.7	1.6	+
200	RENTED - S.H.A. FLATS	83.5	0.8	+
212	FLATS - TENANT S.H.A.	84.8	1.3	−
137	FEMALES - WORKFORCE - 15-19 YEARS	85.4	0.6	+
	REGRESSION EQUATION:			
	186 x −5.6567			
	137 x +1.1389			
	118 x −3.5774			
	200 x +15.9423			
	212 x −13.8536			
	173 x −3.9475			
	20 x +2.3952			
	+56.3514			
S.E.E. = +4.2885				

TABLE 2.7

every electorate in the country.

Next we have the Sales workers - males only. This explains an additional 5.6 percent of the variance. Because the coefficient is negative this is an anti-Labor group. The computer has obviously isolated this strong pro-Liberal group in the urban areas.

The computer then moved on to identify the source of anti-Labor votes in rural areas. This farming variable indicates of course the major source of support for the Country Party and explains an additional 11.2 percent of the variance.

While this variable is listed as "female farmers" I believe it would be strongly correlated with the larger "male farmers" variable.[1] It is, however, much smaller than the male farmers variable (about one-fifth the size) and I believe in fact it indicates the distribution across electorates of the top 20 percent of farms where the female is involved with her spouse as a co-employer or nominal employee in the larger family-run and/or company-run "properties."

Presented in these top three lines then we can see the class-sterotype of the supporters of the three major Australian political groupings: Craftsmen - Labor, Sales - Liberal, and Farmers - Country Party.

Some 78 percent of the variance in the Labor 2 P.P. vote across every electorate in Australia for a decade was explained by these three class factors. Australian electoral behaviour between 1966 and 1975 was therefore overwhelmingly national in character with variations in the average Labor vote due mainly to the distribution of the above three class variables across electorates. (This "average" long-run Labor vote, however, is only one factor in determining who wins and who loses elections. The next crucial factor to be discussed later concerns the variation in swings in

---

1. Project four showed the correlation to be +.99

those electorates where this long-run average vote renders
the seat winnable for Labor.)

The next factor in the Regression table is males non-degree
tertiary - the technical college and teachers' college
graduates of the period leading up to 1971.

When this last variable was included in the regression
equation, the computer then discarded the male Craftsmen
variable because the second, third and fourth stages of the
analysis, in addition to explaining an extra 20.3 percent
of the variance, had by this stage also explained the initial
61.2 percent of the variance contributed by male Craftsmen.

I assume here that the reader has in fact read the preceding
material on regression analysis, especially that contained
in the Appendix to the South Australian project. The only
extra point I perhaps need to make here is that we are dealing
with Labor's two-party-preferred vote which by definition is
the additive inverse of the non-Labor preferred vote. The
computer does not discriminate between pro-Labor Craftsmen
and anti-Labor (Liberal Sales workers and Country Party
Farmers) demographic variables in order to more accurately
predict the Labor 2 P.P. vote because the anti-Labor demo-
graphic variables are often more useful predictors of the
Labor vote.

The sixth step in the regression table illustrated the
positive contribution of males aged 40-44. This line pro-
vides further supporting evidence for figure 2.11.

The next two steps deal with the contribution of the public
housing variables. Here we can see that S.A.H.T. rented
flats had a small positive impact on the size of the Labor
vote across electorates. The variable 212 in this case was
slightly larger in absolute size than the very similar
variable 200, but it had a smaller coefficient. I am unhappy
about the explanations offered by the Bureau of Statistics

about this extra margin as I think the Bureau is unwilling
to admit the presence of weaknesses, however minor, in the
methodology it used to process the 1971 Census results.
Therefore we can say only that public rental housing made
a small net contribution to the mean Labor 2 P.P. vote.

The last step details the small amount of extra variance
explained by 15-19 year old females in the workforce. This
was a positive factor in our long-term Labor vote, as the
reader would have expected given the information contained
in the earlier Pearson Correlation Tables. This line of
the regression table provides additional evidence in support
of figure 2.11.

<div align="center">*   *   *</div>

In table 2.8 we see the long-run volatile voters in stark
relief. All of the information contained in the preceding
tables and figures has been reduced to a mere five lines,
one of which (female Armed Services) is not really significant
outside a handful of federal seats.

The most significant variable - the one that explains most
of the "extra variance" in column four - is rented S.H.A.
houses. Residents of these homes can therefore be considered
to have been the most consistently volatile group across
Australian politics between 1966 and 1975.

The next variable entered into the equation had a negative
impact on electoral volatility. Male Miners were therefore
a relatively stable group between 1966 and 1975.

Next we have females in the 30-34 age group - a variable
which was consistently   volatile between 1966 and 1975.
This provides still more hard evidence for the model described
in figure 2.11.

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

POLITICAL VARIABLE - V11 1966-75 SWING

VARIABLE NUMBER	DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND REGRESSION EQUATION (BELOW)	VARIANCE EXPLAINED (%)	EXTRA VARIANCE EXPLAINED (%)	SIGN OF COEFFICIENT AND CONSTANT
197	RENTED S.H.A. HOUSES	11.9	11.9	+
175	MALES - MINERS	17.9	6.0	−
33	FEMALES - 30 to 34 YEARS	24.1	6.2	+
191	FEMALES - ARMED SERVICES	27.3	3.2	+
214	HOMES WITH T.V.	30.2	2.9	+
	REGRESSION EQUATION:			
	197 x +0.0631			
	33 x +0.4057			
	191 x +0.3132			
	214 x +0.0271			
	175 x −0.2315			
	+0.6307			
S.E.E. = +1.2608				

TABLE 2.8

Females in the Armed Services were also electorally
volatile between 1966 and 1975, but their numbers were
quite small across the nation. Therefore the variable
was useful in a technical sense to describe volatility,
but it is of little practical political value. In no state,
for example, did this variable exceed 0.05 percent of the
total female population.

Finally, we see homes with television sets in 1971 were more
volatile than those without television receivers. I
think that in 1971 most households which were in the then
viewing areas could have easily purchased a television set
if they had so desired. Money was not a real problem.
Therefore this variable really described persons living
in either the 1971 metropolitan or major provincial viewing
areas. In other words, persons living in major urban areas
were more volatile than those in more sparsely settled rural
areas not in receipt of a television signal. I suspect the
positive contribution of this variable to volatility may
also tell us something about the dominance of television
(at least between 1966 and 1975) as an attitude-forming med-
ium.

Let us now examine a summary of the stereotypes of both
long-run Labor voters and long-run volatile voters between
1966 and 1975 in terms of the major demographic groupings.

DEMOGRAPHIC GROUP	LABOR VOTERS	VOLATILE VOTERS
Male/Female	Male	Female*
Age	18-49 (especially males 40-44)*	25-44 (especially 25-39)
Age of the workforce	18-49 (especially females 18-19)*	30-44 (especially 25-39 females <u>not in the workforce</u>)*
Occupation	Miners, Craftsmen,* Transport, Service, Other, Unemployed	Clerical, Armed Services
Usual Major Activity	Persons in workforce (not housewives)	----
Qualifications	Tradesmen	Technicians (male) (University graduates and males with higher degrees run close.)
Occupational Status	Employees	----
Education	Mid-primary and intermediate	Leaving
Ethnicity	Most non-Australian-born, especially Germans, Greeks, Italians, Maltese, Poles, Russians, Yugoslavs, "other" Europe, and migrants of up to nine years' residence.	British, Germans, Dutch, and migrants of five to nine years' residence
Religion	Catholics and Greek Orthodox	Church of England and Congregational (both only just make it)
Housing, T.V., Cars	Public Housing tenants,* Homes with no cars	Public Housing (tenants in expensive rented homes, homes with television sets* and one car

* Shows key demographic groups

The final portion in the discussion of the long-run vote
and long-run volatility between 1966 and 1975 is in many
respects the most interesting of all. For it is here that
we are able to measure the performance of Labor candidates
in each electorate and in each state. As outlined in the
methodology earlier, the computer program explains as much
of the variation in the Labor 2 P.P. vote as it can in terms
of the demographic variables which it has been given. With
the 1966-75 mean vote, a very large percentage of this
"variation" - called variance - can be explained because a
large number of obviously relevant demographic variables
have been included in the data source. In the case of
V11 - 1966-75 mean vote, 85.4 percent of variance was
explained in the national "all-in" analysis of every seat
created at the 1968 redistribution. But what of the remain-
ing 14.6 percent of the variance? Why can't this be explained
also? The answer to this is simply that there are many
exogenous variables which it is impossible to quantify and
include in the computer's data source. These exogenous
factors include the political identity and popularity of
the relevant state   Government and the local Government
authorities, the effectiveness of the state Labor machines
and their affiliated unions in each state and in the various
regions, the personal vote of the Labor candidate relative
to his/her non-Labor opponent, the effectiveness of the
local Labor candidate's campaign, the donkey vote, and the
role of minor party candidates and the allocation of their
preferences at a local level. There are other factors but
I think I have listed the most important ones, although not
necessarily in descending order of significance. I will
introduce each of these briefly.

The State Government: Example - In South Australia in 1968
a popular Labor Government led by Don Dunstan was defeated,
despite the fact that it had polled well over 50 percent
of the vote. Dunstan achieved great public sympathy for
Labor because he was seen to have been cheated of Government
by an unjust Liberal gerrymander. In the 1969 federal
elections South Australia Labor candidates won resounding

victories in most seats with an 11.8 percent state swing
to the A.L.P. (and a state residual of 1.9 percent).
                              .   In 1970 Dunstan won the state elections
and by the time of the 1972 elections he had a sound record
as the popular leader of a competent Government. Despite
this, in 1972 there was a 1.5 percent state swing against
the A.L.P.(and the state residual fell to - 1.8 percent)perhaps
because the electors of South Australia felt that Labor had
been given a "fair deal" in the state elections of 1970.
Therefore the electors could have felt that their over-
whelming sympathy and support given to Labor in 1969 was
no longer warranted.

In summary, if Labor is in power in the state sphere and
performing well, Labor's federal candidates may gain little,
if anything. If on the other hand, a state Labor Government
is seen to be performing badly, it could harm Labor's
federal candidates. In other words, swinging voters could
transfer their allegiance between state and federal Labor
candidates to achieve the sort of "balance" they feel Labor
deserves.

The reverse of the above process could also obviously
occur, and in late 1974 through to early 1976, Labor's
federal unpopularity could have been a liability to state
Labor Governments and Oppositions.

Local Government: Example - The presence of a Labor City
Council in Brisbane has arguably worked to Labor's federal
(and state) disadvantage since 1961. Irrespective of the
competence and the popularity of this sort of local
Government body, Labor's federal and state candidates in
Brisbane have had to accept some political responsibility
for such things as uncollected garbage cans and unfilled
potholes as well as the many other administrative problems
inherent in local Government. Despite the minimal con-
tribution of local Government to the implementation of
Labor's national platform, voters in Brisbane and Queensland's

other major provincial centres could believe that the
presence of Labor local Government administrations really
does install some "balance" in the political system. As
a result, Labor's federal (and state) vote could suffer
accordingly.

State Labor Organisations: The Labor organisation in each
state has an "identity" in its own right, independent of
the perceived effectiveness of Labor's elected politicians.
The evidence may indicate that this identity has a signifi-
cant impact on Labor's performance in each state.

Affiliated Unions: Labor's affiliated unions (and many
which are not affiliated) also have a political identity
in their own right, which varies across states and major
provincial centres where there are regional Trades and
Labor Councils. The public's perception of this identity
and its popularity could help or hinder Labor's candidates.
Also, the types of unions, and the degree ofunionisation may
also have some impact on the A.L.P. federal vote.

The Candidate's Personal Vote: Federal politics in the
period 1966 to 1975 produced a number of federal candidates
who achieved quite remarkable levels of recognition (and in
most cases, popularity) in their own electorates. The
obvious examples include Al Grassby in Riverina and
Rex Patterson in Dawson. How important was this personal
vote as a contribution to these candidates' winning margins?

The donkey vote and role of minor party candidates:
I have made some contribution to debate on the donkey vote
in the earlier South Australian project. Put crudely, I
argued it was roughly proportional to the size of the Labor
vote, ranging from a minimum of 0.5 percent in a seat with
a 45 percent Labor vote, up to about 3.5 percent in a
75 percent Labor seat. I emphasise however that these
calculations were pretty rough and unreliable. Minor party

candidates can also play an important role at the
electorate level. In 1980 Labor benefitted for the first
time from the presence of (mainly Democrat) minor party
candidates. This was especially so in McPherson where an
independent National Party candidate took the exceptional
step of directing his preferences to Labor. I am not in
any position to judge the effect of this factor in every
seat in Australia between 1966 and 1975, but, in a close
contest this can tip the balance for or against Labor.
Ballarat was a case in point during the 1966-75 period
when the former Labor member, Robert Joshua, stood several
times as a D.L.P. candidate, siphoning "Labor" votes away
to the non-Labor parties. The results will show the impact
this had on Labor's fortunes in this seat between 1966 and
1975.

These, then, represent what could have been the main
exogenous factors in Australian federal politics between
1966 and 1975. The media may also have had some dispropor-
tionate impact in some states or regions but I feel that
in general terms, the media bias was reasonably uniform
across the nation, except for perhaps a few major provincial
cities, where sitting Labor candidates may have received a
"good press" as the local member.

I will return to each of these exogenous factors as the
need arises later in this project, when discussing particular
trends. I emphasize, however, that there is in this part
of the discussion, scope for a degree of subjectivity which
the earlier results have not really permitted.

Now I present here the discussion of the observed, predicted
and residual votes contained in tables 2.9 and 2.10 for the
1966-75 mean A.L.P. 2 P.P. vote and the 1966-75 absolute
mean swings respectively.

Table 2.9: This table gives us three pieces of information.
The first column shows the actual average Two-Party-Preferred

ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL	ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL
NSW				ROBERTSON	53.0	52.2	+0.
BANKS	58.5	60.5	-2.0	ST. GEORGE	50.5	53.1	-2.
BARTON	51.5	47.2	+4.2	SHORTLAND	62.1	56.7	+5.
BENNELONG	41.9	45.7	-3.8	SYDNEY	74.9	68.1	+6.
BEROWRA	34.4	39.3	-4.9	WARRINGAH	32.1	33.4	-1.
BLAXLAND	62.8	64.8	-2.0	WENTWORTH	36.2	38.4	-2.
BRADFIELD	24.3	29.6	-5.3	WERRIWA	64.5	62.6	+1.
CALARE	41.0	42.8	-1.8	NSW STATE	50.6	51.1	-0.
CHIFLEY	64.3	64.6	-0.3	VIC			
COOK	46.8	50.0	-3.2				
COWPER	39.5	46.8	-7.3	BALACLAVA	39.5	31.1	+8.
CUNNINGHAM	65.1	64.6	+0.5	BALLARAT	42.2	51.0	-8.
DARLING	60.1	48.5	+11.6	BATMAN	55.7	56.3	-0.
EDEN-MONARO	49.6	49.4	+0.2	BENDIGO	50.0	47.9	+2.
EVANS	49.1	52.2	-3.1	BRUCE	42.1	42.0	+0.
FARRER	36.0	41.6	-5.6	BURKE	59.7	65.0	-5.
GRAYNDLER	71.1	65.9	+5.2	CASEY	46.2	42.0	+4.
GWYDER	41.9	39.7	+2.2	CHISHOLM	34.1	33.3	+0.
HUGHES	63.7	57.1	+6.6	CORANGAMITE	33.4	31.0	+2.
HUME	47.1	42.0	+5.1	CORIO	52.7	58.2	-5.
HUNTER	73.1	62.6	+10.5	DEAKIN	43.2	40.3	+2.
KINGSFORD-SMITH	64.1	61.2	+2.9	DIAMOND VALLEY	45.3	41.5	+3.
LANG	60.8	58.8	+2.0	FLINDERS	41.2	44.9	-3.
LOWE	43.1	47.3	-4.2	GELLIBRAND	64.8	62.5	+2.
LYNE	38.0	45.6	-7.6	GIPPSLAND	31.3	33.3	-2.
MACARTHUR	47.0	51.6	-4.6	HENTY	45.0	42.7	+2.
MACKELLAR	38.3	40.3	-2.0	HIGGINS	34.5	34.3	+0.
MACQUARIE	57.2	53.7	+3.5	HOLT	49.0	55.6	-6.
MITCHELL	44.6	46.5	-1.9	HOTHAM	43.0	46.7	-3.
NEWCASTLE	65.5	57.0	+8.5	INDI	33.7	37.3	-3.
NEW ENGLAND	39.5	41.5	-2.0	ISAACS	44.5	40.8	+3.
NORTH SYDNEY	36.8	34.0	+2.8	KOOYONG	36.1	31.1	+5.
PARRAMATTA	45.1	49.1	-4.0	LALOR	62.1	65.0	-2.
PATERSON	43.9	48.0	-4.0	LA TROBE	48.1	47.1	+1.
PHILLIP	49.5	44.7	+4.8	MALLEE	28.8	30.7	-1.
PROSPECT	60.8	61.0	-0.2	MARIBYRNONG	52.7	54.8	-2.
REID	63.0	63.1	-0.1	McMILLAN	44.0	40.0	+4.
RICHMOND	35.6	39.4	-3.8	MELBOURNE	64.8	73.6	-8.
RIVERINA	46.3	35.4	+10.9	MELBOURNE PORTS	58.2	55.9	+2.

DEPENDENT
VARIABLE: V6 1966-75 MEAN 2 P.P. VOTE

ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL	ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL
MURRAY	27.7	32.2	-4.5	WA			
SCULLIN	61.5	62.0	-0.5	CANNING	39.4	39.7	-0.
WANNON	37.5	33.6	+3.9	CURTIN	35.3	33.9	+1.
WILLS	59.6	62.2	-2.6	FORREST	42.9	43.0	-0.
WIMMERA	38.6	41.4	-2.8	FREMANTLE	59.0	54.0	+5.
VIC STATE	45.8	48.1	-2.3	KALGOORLIE	55.6	57.0	-1.
QLD				MOORE	39.4	42.5	-3.
BOWMAN	49.6	50.9	-1.3	PERTH	51.8	52.5	-0.
BRISBANE	50.0	52.4	-2.4	STIRLING	48.2	47.5	+0.
CAPRICORNIA	56.5	51.8	+4.7	SWAN	51.2	51.5	-0.
DARLING DOWNS	34.7	41.3	-6.7	WA STATE	47.3	47.6	-0.
DAWSON	55.5	50.1	+5.4	TAS			
FISHER	32.4	31.4	+1.0	BASS	52.5	50.6	+1.9
GRIFFITH	46.6	43.7	+2.9	BRADDON	57.1	53.5	+3.6
HERBERT	46.5	53.0	-6.5	DENNISON	49.5	48.8	+0.7
KENNEDY	40.6	45.3	-4.7	FRANKLIN	55.9	56.3	-0.4
LEICHHARDT	56.6	52.2	+4.4	WILMOT	54.7	53.1	+1.6
LILLEY	46.1	51.9	-5.8	TAS STATE	54.0	53.3	+0.7
McPHERSON	37.3	42.9	-5.2	ACT			
MARANOA	34.2	34.0	+0.2	CANBERRA	59.9	56.9	+3.0
MORETON	42.2	47.2	-5.1	FRASER	61.7	56.9	+4.8
OXLEY	61.8	61.0	+0.8	NT			
PETRIE	43.6	49.6	-6.0	NORTHERN TERRITORY	45.4	51.4	-6.0
RYAN	39.5	42.2	-2.7				
WIDE BAY	48.9	45.3	+3.6				
QLD STATE	45.8	48.0	-2.2				
SA							
ADELAIDE	55.4	57.6	-2.2				
ANGAS	32.9	31.4	+1.5				
BARKER	36.4	34.2	+2.2				
BONYTHON	61.0	59.6	+1.4				
BOOTHBY	37.4	39.9	-2.5				
GREY	53.2	54.1	-0.9				
HAWKER	54.7	50.3	+4.4				
HINDMARSH	61.7	56.6	+5.1				
KINGSTON	48.8	45.3	+3.5				
PORT ADELAIDE	67.9	66.2	+1.7				
STURT	44.5	47.8	-3.3				
WAKEFIELD	32.6	30.8	+1.8				
SA STATE	49.4	49.3	+0.1				

ONE SEE = ±4.29

TWO SEE = ±8.58

votes recorded in every national (1968) electorate between
1966 and 1975. As outlined in the methodology to this
project, some manipulation of the political data had to
be done to transfer polling-booth results on to 1968
boundaries for the 1966 results in most seats and for the
1974 and 1975 elections in Western Australia.
The second column shows the "predicted" vote for each of
the same seats based on the regression equation on table
2.7. This regression equation can only compute factors
which are internal to the model: the 206 demographic
variables. Therefore the predicted vote represents an
"ideal" result based on the variation in the percentages
of male Sales workers, female Farmers, males non-degree
tertiary, males 40-44 years, rented S.H.A. flats, flats-
tenant S.H.A. and females in the workforce aged 15-19 years
in every electorate. If for example, the electorate (or
state) under examination contains a high percentage (relative
to the national means) of male Sales workers and female
Farmers (such as an affluent mixed urban and rural electorate)
then it would have a low predicted Labor vote. If we were
examining two such electorates (or states) which were
identical in every respect except that seat A contained more
males aged 40-44 (a pro-Labor group with a positive co-
efficient in the equation) than seat B, then seat A would
ceteris paribus, have a higher predicted Labor vote than
seat B.

The third column measures the residual vote: the result
of the subtraction of the predicted vote from the observed
vote. If we take the first seat in table 2.9 - Banks, we
see the observed vote was 58.5 percent, the predicted vote
was 60.5 percent and the residual (58.5 minus 60.5) was
-2.0 percent. This residual figure therefore can be seen
to be a measure of the effect of all the factors exogenous
to the model which were discussed above.

As we can see in Banks these exogenous factors reduced
Labor's mean 1966-75 vote by 2.0 percent.

The significance of the residuals in each case is measured
by the standard error of estimate (S.E.E.) figure contained
in both table 2.7 and table 2.9. In statistical terms the
standard error of estimate figure represents a deviation from
the predicted vote of one standard deviation. There is
therefore a 68 percent probability that the absolute values
of each residual will be smaller than the standard error of
estimate - in this case ±4.29 percent. There is a 95 percent
probability that the absolute value of each residual will be
within two standard errors of estimate - or ±8.58 percent.
Statistically, it is unusual for a residual to be larger
than ± one standard error of estimate, and extremely unusual
for a residual to be larger than ± two standard errors of
estimate.

So the real substance of these tables is provided by the
size and the sign of the residuals. A large negative
residual for any seat (or state) indicates that exogenous
factors combined to produce a very poor result for Labor;
a large positive residual for any seat (or state) indicates
that exogenous factors combined to produce a very good
result for Labor.

The state residuals deal with only state-based exogenous
factors, while the much larger seat residuals take in all
external factors, including the state-based exogenous
factors.

I suggest the reader now study table 2.9 closely before
moving on to my summary of this information.

First let us proceed to study each case where the absolute
value of the residual exceeded one standard error of
estimate. These results are presented below in table 2.11:

Negative Residuals less than −4.29		Positive Residuals more than +4.29	
Seat	Residual	Seat	Residual
Berowra	−4.9	Darling	+11.6*
Bradfield	−5.3	Grayndler	+5.2
Cowper	−7.3	Hughes	+6.6
Farrer	−5.6	Hume	+5.1
Lyne	−7.6	Hunter	+10.5*
Macarthur	−4.6	Newcastle	+8.5
Ballarat	−8.8*	Phillip	+4.8
Burke	−5.3	Riverina	+10.9*
Corio	−5.5	Shortland	+5.4
Holt	−6.6	Sydney	+6.8
Melbourne	−8.8*	Balaclava	+8.4
Murray	−4.5	Kooyong	+5.0
Darling Downs	−6.7	Capricornia	+4.7
Herbert	−6.5	Dawson	+5.4
Kennedy	−4.7	Leichhardt	+4.4
Lilley	−5.8	Hawker	+4.4
McPherson	−5.2	Hindmarsh	+5.1
Moreton	−5.1	Fremantle	+5.0
Petrie	−6.0	Fraser	+4.8
N.T.	−6.0		

TABLE 2.11

* indicates residual > ± 2 S.E.E.S.

The reader can see here the three best results for Labor
were in New South Wales. The industrial/provincial city
of Newcastle provided an outstandingly strong base for Labor
candidates in Newcastle, Hunter and Shortland. I don't know
what combination of exogenous factors produced this fortunate
result for Labor, but obviously the degree of unionisation

and the industrial strength among workers in the city's Coal and Steel industries would have had a major impact.

A similar industrial and union situation existed in Darling (at the major population centre of Broken Hill) to help produce the nation's best result for 1966-75.

In Riverina however, I would attribute the excellent result to the personal vote of Labor's candidate for most of this period: Al Grassby.

Other excellent results for Labor were obtained in the heavy industrial/waterfront seats in Sydney, Adelaide and Perth. Labor's positive residual in Kooyong, bearing in mind the identity of the sitting Liberal member, remains a mystery to me. Labor also fared well in some Queensland provincial city seats.

On the negative side, Labor fared badly in the Sydney North Shore seats of Bradfield and Berowra and the country seats of Cowper, Farrer, Lyne and Macarthur.

Victoria produced the worst two results for the nation in Ballarat and Melbourne. There appears to be little discernible local pattern here however.

Queensland provides a depressing list of negative residuals for both provincial city and urban seats, again with no apparent pattern.

A close examination of the state-based analyses not presented here indicates that Queensland and New South Wales displayed a high degree of regional diversity in their electoral behaviour between 1966-75 and that this led to the greater range of residuals in table 2.11.

On the other hand, the evidence clearly indicates that the
political nature of the electoral systems in the above two
states is significantly different from both South Australia
and Western Australia, where an exceptionally high degree
of variance is explained for the respective state-based
analyses, leading in turn to the under-representation of
these two states in table 2.11.

Table 2.12 summarises the gross and net effects of these
seat residuals on a state basis.

STATE	POSITIVE RESIDUALS	NEGATIVE RESIDUALS	NET EFFECT
N.S.W.	10	6	+4
VIC.	2	6	-4
QLD.	3	7	-4
S.A.	2	0	+2
W.A.	1	0	+1
TAS.	0	0	0
TER.	1	1	0
TOTAL	19	20	-1

TABLE 2.12

As we can see from table 2.12, a clear picture is beginning
to emerge of the impact of state-based exogenous factors
between 1966-75.

Let us take this analysis one stage further and relate this
performance across the states to the marginality of the
electorates within each state. We do this by listing the

seats where the predicted vote was more than 50.1 percent
and the observed vote was less than 50.1 percent (seats
Labor should have won, but didn't) and seats where the
predicted vote was less than 50.1 percent and the observed
vote was more than 50.1 percent (seats Labor should not have
won, but did).

These seats are listed below in table 2.13.

Seats Labor should have won, but didn't	States	Seats Labor shouldn't have won, but did
Evans Macarthur	N.S.W. 0	Barton Darling
Ballarat Holt	VIC. -2	-
Bowman Brisbane Herbert Lilley	QLD. -4	-
N.T.	TER. -1	-

TABLE 2.13

Table 2.13 now shows how extraordinary the result really
was for Labor in Darling between 1966 and 1975. Not only
was this the best result across the nation, but it was
built on a base predicted vote of less than 50 percent!

Table 2.13 also shows that exogenous factors had no net
effect on Labor's share of the seats in New South Wales
between 1966 and 1975, and no effect at all in Tasmania,
South Australia and Western Australia. The Northern Territory

however provided an unfavourable result for Labor.

The real problem areas for the A.L.P. between 1966 and 1975 were in the two States of Queensland and Victoria, where poor performances across most electorates were combined with a disproportionate number of marginal electorates to cost the A.L.P. a total of six electorates.

These state-based problems can be easily identified by the following state summary of the observed, predicted and residual votes from table 2.9, presented below in table 2.14.

STATE	OBSERVED	PREDICTED	RESIDUAL
New South Wales	50.6	51.1	-0.5
Victoria	45.8	48.1	-2.3
Queensland	45.8	48.0	-2.2
South Australia	49.4	49.3	+0.1
Western Australia	47.3	47.8	-0.3
Tasmania	54.0	53.3	+0.7

TABLE 2.14

The figures for the residuals in table 2.14 represent the state-based exogenous factors referred to earlier in the discussion.

The figures for the residuals in table 2.9 represent these state-based exogenous factors and all other exogenous factors as well.

So, if the reader seeks to evaluate the performance of any individual seat between 1966 and 1975, independent of state factors, it is first necessary to subtract the

residual figures from table 2.14 from the corresponding residuals in table 2.9.

Example: If we examine Holt in Victoria we see from table 2.9 that Labor in that seat polled 6.6 percent less than it should have between 1966 and 1975. But 2.3 percent of this 6.6 percent was due to Labor's poor performance across all Victorian electorates, so that seat-based exogenous factors peculiar to Holt would have produced a negative residual of 4.3 percent ((-6.6 -(-2.3)).

The obvious significance of this little calculation is that if Holt had been a seat in any state other than Victoria or Queensland it would have had an average 1966-75 A.L.P. vote of more than 50 percent.

Summary of discussion on table 2.9: Labor's average 2 P.P. vote for 1966 to 1975 was some 2.3 percent less than it should have been in both Victoria and Queensland. This poor performance in these two States cost the A.L.P. an average of six seats. The residuals in all other states were less than ± 0.7 percent causing no net loss or gain of marginal seats. Individual residuals for all seats showed that Labor performed extremely well in some highly industrialised inner-city and provincial-city seats.

Table 2.10 lists the observed, predicted and residual
absolute mean swings figures for all seats and states
between 1966 and 1975. My discussion of this and other
swing residuals will be briefer than that provided for the
2 P.P. votes. The 2 P.P. results can be usefully illustrated
by the residuals, whereas the swing figures for successive
elections can be better understood in terms of the earlier
Pearson Correlation Tables, bar-chart figures and Multiple
Regression Tables. Discussion here will deal mainly with
state-based exogenous factors shown in table 2.15 below,
and regional exogenous factors illustrated by map 2.2.

DEPENDENT
VARIABLE: V11 1966-75 MEAN SWING   TABLE 2.10   4.57

ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL	ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL
NSW				ROBERTSON	5.8	4.8	+1.
BANKS	5.4	5.9	-0.5	ST. GEORGE	5.2	5.0	+0.
BARTON	4.7	4.8	-0.1	SHORTLAND	5.1	5.4	-0.
BENNELONG	5.7	5.2	+0.5	SYDNEY	5.5	4.7	+0.
BEROWRA	6.5	5.8	+0.7	WARRINGAH	5.4	4.9	+0.
BLAXLAND	6.8	5.5	+1.3	WENTWORTH	5.1	4.9	+0.
BRADFIELD	6.4	5.8	+0.6	WERRIWA	5.5	7.0	-1.
CALARE	3.0	5.4	-2.4				
CHIFLEY	8.4	6.8	+1.6	NSW STATE	5.0	5.3	-0.
COOK	4.0	5.4	-1.4	VIC			
COWPER	5.1	5.0	+0.1	BALACLAVA	5.9	4.7	+1.
CUNNINGHAM	6.3	6.0	+0.3	BALLARAT	3.7	4.9	-1.
DARLING	2.7	3.6	-0.9	BATMAN	3.8	5.2	-1.
EDEN-MONARO	3.4	5.3	-1.9	BENDIGO	3.1	5.1	-2.
EVANS	5.1	5.1	+0.0	BRUCE	5.3	6.4	-1.
FARRER	7.6	5.5	+2.1	BURKE	5.8	6.1	-0.
GRAYNDLER	4.8	5.3	-0.5	CASEY	5.6	6.0	-0.
GWYDER	4.3	5.6	-1.3	CHISHOLM	5.2	4.8	+0.
HUGHES	4.5	5.4	-0.9	CORANGAMITE	4.6	5.4	-0.
HUME	4.0	5.5	-1.5	CORIO	5.0	5.5	-0.
HUNTER	2.3	4.3	-2.0	DEAKIN	5.4	5.6	-0.
KINGSFORD-SMITH	5.3	5.3	-0.0	DIAMOND VALLEY	5.8	6.6	-0.
LANG	6.1	5.1	+1.0	FLINDERS	5.0	5.6	-0.
LOWE	4.2	4.7	-0.5	GELLIBRAND	2.9	5.1	-2.
LYNE	5.6	5.2	+0.4	GIPPSLAND	5.5	5.3	+0.
MACARTHUR	7.0	5.2	+1.8	HENTY	4.9	4.9	+0.
MACKELLAR	7.4	5.8	+1.6	HIGGINS	4.0	4.9	-0.
MACQUARIE	5.9	5.4	+0.5	HOLT	7.2	5.9	+1.
MITCHELL	6.8	6.2	+0.6	HOTHAM	3.2	5.2	-2.
NEWCASTLE	5.3	4.2	+1.1	INDI	4.8	5.4	-0.
NEW ENGLAND	5.4	5.2	+0.2	ISAACS	4.9	5.0	-0.
NORTH SYDNEY	5.5	4.9	+0.6	KOOYONG	4.4	4.7	-0.
PARRAMATTA	4.9	5.7	-0.8	LALOR	4.9	6.0	-1.
PATERSON	5.5	5.2	+0.3	LA TROBE	6.2	5.7	+0.
PHILLIP	5.1	4.8	+0.3	MALLEE	6.5	5.4	+1.
PROSPECT	7.0	5.9	+1.0	MARIBYRNONG	4.7	5.3	-0.
REID	5.4	5.3	+0.1	McMILLAN	3.2	5.5	-2.
RICHMOND	2.6	4.9	-2.3	MELBOURNE	6.0	5.0	+1.
RIVERINA	9.4	5.3	+4.1	MELBOURNE PORTS	5.2	5.0	+0.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: V11 1966-75 MEAN SWING

ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL	ELECTORATE	OBSERVED VOTE	PREDICTED VOTE	RESIDUAL
MURRAY	4.1	5.6	-1.5	WA			
SCULLIN	5.4	5.6	-0.2	CANNING	5.7	5.9	-0.
WANNON	5.4	5.0	+0.4	CURTIN	5.1	4.7	+0.
WILLS	2.8	5.2	-2.4	FORREST	5.9	5.3	+0.
WIMMERA	5.2	5.3	-0.1	FREMANTLE	5.5	6.0	-0.
VIC STATE	4.5	5.4	-0.9	KALGOORLIE	3.6	3.9	-0.
QLD				MOORE	4.2	5.9	-1.
BOWMAN	5.8	5.6	+0.2	PERTH	7.5	5.2	+2.
BRISBANE	3.7	4.3	-0.6	STIRLING	7.4	6.5	+0.9
CAPRICORNIA	5.3	5.1	+0.2	SWAN	5.5	5.5	-0.0
DARLING DOWNS	3.5	4.6	-1.1	WA STATE	4.7	5.4	-0.7
DAWSON	5.9	3.9	+2.0	TAS			
FISHER	4.3	4.8	-0.5	BASS	8.0	5.3	+2.7
GRIFFITH	3.3	4.4	-1.1	BRADDON	6.2	4.4	+1.8
HERBERT	2.0	5.4	-3.4	DENNISON	4.1	4.7	-0.6
KENNEDY	2.7	3.4	-0.7	FRANKLIN	8.3	6.2	+2.1
LEICHHARDT	5.6	4.2	+1.4	WILMOT	5.6	5.0	+0.6
LILLEY	4.3	4.7	-0.4				
McPHERSON	7.0	5.0	+2.0	TAS STATE	6.7	5.1	+1.6
MARANOA	4.3	4.6	-0.3	ACT			
MORETON	4.3	5.2	-0.9	CANBERRA	10.4	10.4	+0.0
OXLEY	6.2	6.2	-0.0	FRASER	8.9	7.3	+1.6
PETRIE	4.8	5.7	-0.9	NT			
RYAN	6.4	5.5	+0.9	NORTHERN TERRITORY	4.0	4.3	-0.3
WIDE BAY	5.7	4.9	+0.8				
QLD STATE	3.9	5.0	-1.1	ONE STANDARD ERROR = 1.26			
SA				TWO STANDARD ERRORS = 2.52			
ADELAIDE	6.0	5.0	+1.0				
ANGAS	4.8	5.3	-0.5				
BARKER	4.9	5.6	-0.7				
BONYTHON	7.7	8.0	-0.2				
BOOTHBY	5.5	4.7	+0.8				
GREY	4.1	6.3	-2.2				
HAWKER	5.9	5.4	+0.5				
HINDMARSH	8.1	5.3	+2.8				
KINGSTON	8.4	5.5	+2.9				
PORT ADELAIDE	5.8	5.7	+0.1				
STURT	6.7	6.1	+0.6				
WAKEFIELD	5.2	4.9	+0.3				
SA STATE	5.3	5.6	-0.3				

STATE	OBSERVED	PREDICTED	RESIDUAL
New South Wales	5.0	5.3	-.3
Victoria	4.5	5.4	-.9
Queensland	3.9	5.0	-1.1
South Australia	5.3	5.6	-.3
Western Australia	4.7	5.4	-.7
Tasmania	6.7	5.1	+1.6

TABLE 2.15

Queensland was the most unresponsive state to electoral
swings, as we can see from the "observed" column of
table 2.15. It also had the lowest predicted swings, and
the lowest negative residual. In other words, Queensland
appeared on the demographic evidence to have been the most
stable state, and in fact this was the (observed) case,
but to an even greater degree than could be predicted from
demographic factors.

Queensland's higher age levels, lower education levels and
lower frequency of television receivers can't have been
responsible for this stability because all of these factors
were measured and included in the demographic model.

So Queensland was the state which recorded the second-worst
votes for Labor between 1966-75 and it also recorded the
lowest (inexplicable) swings.

Reasons abound for the first result, but the second one
is much more murky. I don't think you can entirely blame
the media bias of Queensland Newspapers as there is little
evidence about to indicate this was any worse in Queensland
(or Victoria - another low residual for V11) than any other
state. The greater regionalisation of Queensland can't have
been responsible, because, as map 2.2 shows, the provincial
city seats provided some of the areas of highest unexplained

volatility. The state components of the national campaigns,
at least during the first two-thirds of the period 1966-75,
were probably on a par with other states. Tom Burns was the
chief driving force behind the State Branch during much of
this period, when he was also National A.L.P. President.
His effectiveness within Queensland certainly would not have
been less than it was for Australia as a nation.

I also think it's a bit facile to blame Labor's Queensland
candidates, as many of these were certainly attractive and
popular in their own electorates across the state and indeed
across the country.

This really only leaves the trade unions in Queensland, the
role of Labor local Government administrations, and more
importantly the part played by Queensland's State Government
led by Bjelke-Petersen and his media staff, relative to the
influence wielded by the equivalent State Labor team.

The media power of the Queensland State Government is quite
extraordinary by Australian standards and can be crudely
measured by the number of journalists it employs. I have
been told by Australian Journalists' Association officials
that some 60 journalists are on the State Government's
payroll and that they even comprise a powerful voting bloc
at State A.J.A. elections. The State Labor Opposition in
contrast, has only one journalist on the public payroll.

I will let the reader come to his own conclusions about
Queensland's resistance to electoral change during 1966-75,
but I think the State non-Labor Government would have played
a major role in the maintenance of status quo politics in
this period, especially when combined with Queensland's
Media Incorporated: Queensland Newspapers.

Victoria was similar to Queensland in terms of table 2.15,
and perhaps the reasons for this were similar as well. I

am not in a position to judge from the evidence so far
presented. I simply note that Labor's worst two states
on the performance measure (V6) were also the two most
stable states on the volatility measure (V11).

All the other states except Tasmania were reasonably close
to the predicted levels of volatility, with both observed and
predicted swings centred on the five percent mark.

Tasmania was the only exception, with an observed volatility
far in excess of the predicted result. As with Victoria,
I am ill-equipped to assess the major parochial exogenous
factors for this volatility. However an examination of the
Tasmanian state-based analyses indicates a fair bit of
idiosyncratic electoral behaviour on the Apple Isle during
the period 1966-75, especially the latter part of this
period when the unemployed and craftsmen seemed to be
voting strongly against Labor. Presumably the National
Labor Government's attitude to tariff protection had some
impact on this, boosting volatility during the 1974 and
1975 elections, when the swing was on against Labor.

The evidence generally indicates that Tasmanian voters are
motivated mainly by their dislike of an incumbent Federal
Government which faces diminishing returns from additional
pork-barrelling.

THE MAPS

Maps of the residuals provide useful geographical guides to areas of unexplained variance due to factors which are exogenous to the regression equations.

Map 2.1 shows the residuals from V6, the 1966-75 mean 2 P.P. vote, with the stronger Labor areas (high positive residuals) marked with darker shading. The map can be summarised as follows:

New South Wales - Strongholds are concentrated in three main areas, the western country seats of Darling, Riverina and Hume, the Newcastle seats of Hunter, Newcastle and Shortland and the inner-city seats of Sydney and Grayndler. Other areas of moderate strength lie in the southern Sydney seats of Phillip, Kingsford-Smith, Lang, Barton and Cook. Hughes, in particular, was an excellent seat for Labor.

Major weaknesses are centred on the northern country seats of Cowper and Lyne in the rural areas, and in the capital city, there is an area of deficit performance centred on Bradfield and stretching in a wide anti-clockwise arc through MacKellar, Berowra, Parramatta, Bennelong and then down into the inner-western suburbs including Lowe, Evans, Blaxland, Banks and St. George.

Victoria - Strengths are few and far between and wasted in the safe Liberal seats of Kooyong and Balaclava. This represents an extraordinarily poor result for the Liberal member for Kooyong and aspirant Liberal leader.

There are some areas of moderate strength in the eastern suburbs' seats of Isaacs, Henty, Deakin, Diamond Valley and Casey, and in the seat of Melbourne Ports. Labor also does quite well in the country seats of Wannon and Corangamite. Evidently Liberal voters in these two seats lack self-discipline.

HERBERT

DAWSON

NORTHERN TERRITORY
LEICHARDT
KENNEDY
KALGOORLIE
WAKEFIELD
MARANOA
GREY
DARLING

CAPRICORNIA

WIDE BAY

FISHER

DARLING DOWNS

GWYDIR
NEW ENGLAND
McPHERSON
RICHMOND
COWPER

LYNE
PATERSON
CALARE
MACQUARIE
HUME
FARRER
McARTHUR
EDEN-MONARO

NEWCASTLE
HUNTER
SYDNEY
SHORTLAND
CUNNINGHAM

CHIFLEY
MACQUARIE
PROSPECT

FRASER
CANBERRA
A.C.T.

GIPPSLAND

MELBOURNE
1. CORANGMITE
2. BALLAARAT
3. BENDIGO
4. MURRAY
5. McMILLAN

MOORE
PERTH
CANNING
FORREST

ADELAIDE

ANGAS
MALLEE
RIVERINA
BARKER
WIMMERA
WANNON
INDI

PETRIE
FISHER
LILLEY
RYAN
1
2
BOWMAN
3
OXLEY
McPHERSON

BRISBANE
1. BRISBANE
2. GRIFFITH
3. MORETON

ROBERTSON
MITCHELL
BEROWRA
MACKELLAR
BRADFIELD

4   3 2 1
5 6 7   9
15   8 10
14 13   11
16   12
17
WERRIWA
18
MACARTHUR
HUGHES
SYDNEY

1. WARRINGAH   10. WENTWORTH
2. NORTH SYDNEY   11. PHILLIP
3. BENNELONG   12. KINGSFORD-SMITH
4. PARRAMATTA   13. St. GEORGE
5. REID   14. LANG
6. LOWE   15. BLAXLAND
7. EVANS   16. BANKS
8. GRAYNDLER   17. BARTON
9. SYDNEY   18. COOK.

STIRLING
PERTH
CURTIN
SWAN
FREMANTLE
PERTH

BENDIGO
BURKE
BALLAARAT
DIAMOND VALLEY
CASEY
LATROBE

BONYTHON
STURT
PORT ADELAIDE
ADELAIDE
HINDMARSH
ANGAS
HAWKER
BOOTHBY
KINGSTON
BARKER
ADELAIDE

LALOR
CORIO
MELBOURNE.
HOLT
McMILLAN
FLINDERS

4
2 3 5
12 6
1 15 13 7 8
14 9
16
10
11

1. GELLIBRAND   9. BRUCE
2. MARIBYRNONG   10. HOTHAM
3. WILLS   11. ISAACS
4. SCULLIN   12. MELBOURNE
5. BATMAN   13. HIGGINS
6. KOOYONG   14. HENTY
7. CHISHOLM   15. MELBOURNE PORTS.
8. DEAKIN   16. BALACLAVA.

BRADDON
BASS
WILMOT
FRANKLIN
DENNISON
HOBART

4.64

PERTH

PERTH

ADELAIDE

ADELAIDE

MELBOURNE

HOBART

BRISBANE

BRISBANE

SYDNEY

A.C.T.

Legend:
≥5.0
+2.0 → +4.9
−1.9 → +1.9
−2.0 → −4.9
−5.0 <

Map 2.1
V6 - 1966-75
mean 2PP.
RESIDUALS

Holt recorded poor votes for Labor between 1966 and 1975 as did Melbourne and also Burke and Corio in the outlying western suburbs. The western suburbs also returned weak Labor votes in Lalor, Maribyrnong and Wills.

In the rural areas, Ballarat recorded appalling votes for its Labor candidates between 1966 and 1975, due mainly I believe, to the strength of the D.L.P. in this area. (Now this seat has been regained for Labor in 1980 it should remain Labor so long as the D.L.P. stays quiescent in the local area.)

Other low votes were recorded in the country seats of Wimmera, Murray, Indi and Gippsland. These negative residuals reflect mainly the personal votes of the sitting non-Labor members in these seats.

Queensland - This state wasn't all bad between 1966 and 1975, but the areas of strength are hard to find. The personal votes of popular sitting Labor members in the provincial-city seats of Leichhardt, Dawson, Capricornia and Wide Bay easily overcame the poor state vote and ensured good results in these areas. Labor also polled well in Griffith, making nonsense of the mythology about the strong personal vote of the former sitting Liberal member.

Labor performed badly in Herbert (a seat Labor should hold at most elections), the Darling Downs and McPherson in the non-Brisbane area, and in Brisbane Labor also polled badly in Petrie, Lilley and Moreton. Performances in the two Brisbane north-side seats of Brisbane and Ryan were mediocre and complete a very dismal picture of A.L.P. performance in the northern suburban seats.

South Australia - Excellent votes were recorded in Hindmarsh and Barker, and to a lesser extent, in Kingston. The inner-city and eastern/south-eastern seats of Adelaide, Sturt and Boothby were all mediocre results for Labor.

<u>Western Australia</u> - Fremantle was consistently good for Labor during 1966-75, while the rest of Western Australia's seats (except Moore) were very close to the predicted votes.

<u>Tasmania</u> - Braddon in the north-west, was consistently good for Labor.

<u>Summary</u> - Major areas of strength for Labor throughout the country could be found mainly in the industrialised provincial cities outside the capitals. In the capital cities, the waterfront seats and those in the inner-city areas were generally excellent for the A.L.P.

Major areas of weakness for Labor outside the capital cities can be seen centred on the country seats in north-east N.S.W. and south-east Queensland. In the capital cities, there were very poor results in Brisbane's northern suburbs, and inner-southern and outlying southern suburbs, Sydney's northern and mid -western suburbs were also poor results, as were the western suburbs of Melbourne and the eastern suburbs of Adelaide.

Map 2.2 shows the residuals for V11 - the 1966-75 absolute mean Labor vote.

The map can be summarised as follows:

New South Wales. Volatile - The Murrumbidgee Irrigation area seats of Riverina and Farrer, the outer western suburban seats of Sydney and the coastal northern suburban Sydney seats.

Stable - The country seats around Calare and the southern

4·68

PERTH

BRISBANE

BRISBANE

ADELAIDE

SYDNEY

A.C.T.

MELBOURNE

PERTH

SYDNEY

ADELAIDE

MELBOURNE

HOBART

>2
·8 → 1·9
·7 → −·7
−1·9 → −·8
−2 <

Map 2.2
V11 − 1966-75
absolute mean
swing.
RESIDUALS

suburban seats of Sydney.

<u>Victoria</u>. Volatile - The apparently unrelated seats of
Melbourne, Balaclava and Holt in the capital city. There
was no unexplained volatility to speak of in the Victorian
country areas.

<u>Queensland</u>. Volatile - The provincial city seats in
general, especially Dawson and McPherson.

Stable - A patchy affair including Herbert, Darling Downs,
Lilley, Griffith and Moreton.

<u>South Australia</u>. Volatile - The western coastal city seats
of Hindmarsh and Kingston and to a lesser extent, Adelaide
and Boothby.

Stable - Grey - fortunately for the A.L.P.

<u>Western Australia</u>. Volatile - Perth and Stirling.

Stable - Moore.

<u>Tasmania</u>. Volatile - The three seats of Bass, Braddon and
Franklin.

Stable - <u>none</u>.

I repeat here that map 2.2 does not show areas of volatility
as explained by the regression equation. It shows areas
where factors external to the regression equation had a
significant impact. The map generally shows that this
unexplained variance took place in a pretty random fashion,
however we could say that the inexplicable volatile areas
included provincial-city seats, Sydney's outer-western
suburbs, Adelaide's western suburbs, Perth's northern
suburbs and most of Tasmania. Inexplicable stable areas

included many rural seats, Brisbane's inner-southern
suburbs, Sydney's outer-southern suburbs, and quite a
few Melbourne seats taking in the northern and western
suburbs.